Full transcript: Simon Mann on London Real
0:00 Simon Mann: Armies don’t solve social problems. It isn’t the solution; it’s a part of the problem. Private military contracting has always happened and always will.
Brian Rose: What’s the going rate for retaking a city?
Simon Mann: Five million, and five million bonus after it’s done.
Brian Rose: How do you get involved in a coup d’état of Equatorial Guinea?
Simon Mann: I want to know that the dictatorship, the tyranny, is horrible. If it turns out the tyrant’s not really a tyrant, then I’m not interested. It was awful: people being sacrificially eaten, street boys being taken off the street and used for sexual purposes, and so on and so forth. We go to Harare to collect the weapons and ammunition, and we’re surrounded by twenty people in black overalls with MP5s. “Get down off the truck, you’re under arrest.” We’re in prison. They take me to Black Beach prison and they start interrogating me, and within ten days I had meltdown, and I thought, I think I must have hit the bottom here. Well, one Saturday the Attorney General said, “Well, you’re going to get a pardon.” An hour later we were sitting in the hotel having lunch.
Brian Rose: How many years had you been there at that point? What do you want people to learn from your story?
Simon Mann: The real key to leadership is personal honesty, because people will trust the truth, and if you haven’t got that within yourself then it isn’t going to get to them. Just stay true to yourself at all costs.
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Brian Rose: This is London Real. I am Brian Rose. My guest today: they say truth is stranger than fiction, and that was never more the case than when it comes to Simon Mann. He went to school at Eton, one of the top private schools in the UK, and went on to become an SAS officer. His father was the captain of the England cricket team, but Simon went the other way and ended up becoming a mercenary. He fought in Angola over the oil wells, then he went to Sierra Leone and fought the rebels over diamond mines. But he wasn’t finished, because he was about to take part in a coup d’état in Equatorial Guinea to depose the ruler, and by doing so he got locked up in prison for years of his life. Later he was pardoned by the president, and now he’s friends with the same man who had him locked up in prison and was going to kill him at one point. It doesn’t get any crazier. I love Simon Mann. He really exemplifies pushing life to the limits and just going for it. This story might offend you, it might bother you, what he did, but it doesn’t bother me, because I just love this guy and I love what he did. So sit back for the craziest ride you’ve ever been on, with Simon Mann. This is London Real. I am Brian Rose. My guest today is Simon Mann, the British mercenary and former SAS officer who served seven years in jail for a failed coup d’état to replace the dictator of Equatorial Guinea in Africa. In the 1990s your company, Executive Outcomes, provided mercenary services for civil wars and diamond wars in Angola and Sierra Leone. Then in 2004, during the coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea, you were arrested in Zimbabwe and served years in two of Africa’s toughest jails, including the infamous Black Beach prison, before later being pardoned. Today you speak around the world about your experiences and provide expertise on private military contracting and mining. Simon, welcome back to London Real.
Simon Mann: Thank you very much.
4:43 Brian Rose: Pleasure having you here. Your last show has been watched by over half a million people, and people were completely divided by your story. Some people were fascinated, some people were appalled. What do you make of that reaction? I’m sure you get that all the time.
Simon Mann: Yes, I do. Most people have a much better opinion of me, and impression of me, after they’ve met me.
Brian Rose: How surprising is that? Because they think you’re this one thing and then they meet you and they realise…
Simon Mann: Well, I think it’s the labelling thing. Obviously mercenaries have had a pretty bad press over the years.
Brian Rose: Is it the right word to use? Is it just misunderstood?
Simon Mann: I wouldn’t say it’s misunderstood. Mercenary as a word: you can be a mercenary doctor. If somebody says the doctor is such a mercenary, they mean the guy’s more worried about making money than he is about being a doctor, which is fair enough. So a mercenary soldier is… again, are the Gurkhas mercenaries? Is any professional soldier a mercenary, or do you have to be outside the recognised armed forces of a country in order to be a mercenary? It becomes a very pernickety argument after quite a short time.
Brian Rose: Like you said, you get into the weeds there, because if this guy is being paid for military services and this guy is a Navy SEAL, sometimes they’re side by side in places like Iraq, for example with Blackwater.
Simon Mann: Exactly.
Brian Rose: What’s the difference, except one guy’s being paid ten times as much?
Simon Mann: Sometimes, yes. So it gets to be a fine line. Going back even into the 70s, when there was the war going on in Oman, the sort of secret war that the British were engaged in, supporting the Sultan, Sultan Qaboos. I was around at that time. I didn’t actually take part in it, but I could have been in the same firefight by three completely different routes. I could have been an SAS officer with SAS soldiers. I could have been a seconded British officer with Omani troops or Baluchi troops. Or I could have been a contract officer. Same firefight, same job, same everything, except most people would not classify the first two as mercenaries, but they would the third, maybe, because I’m a contract officer. But then some people would say, well, wait a minute, you weren’t really, because you were serving under the crown, so to speak. You were on a contract, you were in the armed forces of Oman. Does that make you a mercenary? Then are the Gurkhas mercenaries? We have Gurkhas in the British Army. Is the Swiss Guard of the Pope in Rome mercenaries? Because originally they were Swiss, famously, Swiss mercenaries in the Middle Ages. So it gets sort of fuzzy. There is in fact an African convention for the doing away with mercenaries, from the 1960s, where they tried to define mercenaries very finely, because they were going to hang them. That’s quite interesting reading. I have actually read it. I read it while I was in prison there, with a certain amount of interest. It very clearly states that you are only a mercenary if there is a war. You’re not a mercenary unless there is a declared war. You’re not a mercenary if you’re within the armed forces of a country, and you’re not a mercenary unless you’ve actually fought. So you could be a supply pilot, armed to the teeth, a white guy in a horrible war in the middle of Africa, and you’re not a mercenary according to that convention. People have tried to nail it down, but like anything, it’s difficult.
Brian Rose: And we saw Erik Prince, who had founded Blackwater, has gone into the logistics business.
Simon Mann: I know Erik quite well. And yes, he is in the logistics business, absolutely.
Brian Rose: Which is probably a very profitable business, and just as tricky as security maybe.
Simon Mann: Yes. Again the lines become blurred, because if you’re doing logistics in a war zone, then it’s exactly what I was saying about the African convention against mercenaries: at what point are you actually a mercenary soldier? With the African convention, all the attending countries passed it, but none of them enacted it, other than South Africa, who introduced the FMA, the Foreign Military Assistance Act, which came in in 1998 and was specifically targeted at Executive Outcomes.
Brian Rose: Which was your company.
Simon Mann: Yes, and that was the end of it. Exactly.
Brian Rose: So that was specifically targeted at you.
Simon Mann: It’s our own personal piece of legislation.
Brian Rose: Well, look, I want to get into Executive Outcomes, how you made the transition from the British military and the SAS into becoming a mercenary for Executive Outcomes, and the thinking behind that. Before we get into that, I was reminded literally a few minutes before we started of a quote attributed to Winston Churchill: “We sleep safely at night because rough men stand ready to visit violence on those who would harm us.” It’s a quote I think a lot of people have heard. I always think about the person who’s willing to go to the supermarket and buy the nice pretty steak in the cellophane wrapper but isn’t willing to go out and shoot the animal and gut it. I’m curious what you think of most people who, when they think of warriors and war and military servants, point the finger and say that’s bad, and yet they enjoy their peace and prosperity, which is only because of the military. How does that make you feel?
Simon Mann: It doesn’t bother me at all, actually. I think it’s fine. I don’t really want them walking around thinking, oh my God, these terrible things are going on. If they are going on, that’s just the way our society has always been. The example I always use is Jane Austen. If you read all the Jane Austen books, there are I think only a couple of references in the entire body of work that she wrote to the war. But the fact is that England was in an existential war against Napoleon for most of that time, and there’s hardly any mention in the books. That’s rather nice: these things are going on over there, everything’s going on calmly here. That’s a good way to keep it.
Brian Rose: So you think the public shouldn’t necessarily know what’s going on, and leave that to the services and these special forces?
Simon Mann: It’s an interesting difference between the United States and the UK. The US is much more vociferous. For example, the whole veteran thing really is a big deal in the States, whereas it’s a much lesser deal here, although that is changing. It’s an interesting cultural difference. In the UK, with its whole imperial past, people got buried where they died. They always were; they didn’t come back, partly for obvious logistical reasons. Whereas the Americans have always tried to get people back, and I think that shows a different attitude to what’s going on. Similarly the French: dying in defence of France is fine, but dying in some foreign place for some not very clear objective is not fine, and hence the Foreign Legion.
Brian Rose: Right. Get some other people to do it for you.
Simon Mann: Yes.
13:41 Brian Rose: Really interesting. Look, I want to get into your story about how you were first introduced to Africa. I think you’ve just come back from Africa, so you’re still involved in doing business over there, and I want to hear about what it was like to do what you did at Executive Outcomes and why you did it, so people understand it. But you started off with a background that would never seem to land someone in a prison in Zimbabwe or in Equatorial Guinea. You went to Eton. For people in America, what does it mean to go to Eton? You’re surrounded by people who are probably going to become members of parliament and these types of things.
Simon Mann: A few. But actually Eton, certainly when I was there, was an incredibly broad brush. You had all sorts of people, and I think you always have had, from what I can gather. It’s always difficult; you only know one school. That was my school, and I thought it was sort of normal. What was it like? Oh, I loved it. I had a really good time.
Brian Rose: And how is it different from other schools? I know you didn’t go to them, but what makes Eton different?
Simon Mann: I think Eton is very cosmopolitan. It’s close to London, with all that that means. There’s no campus; it’s open. Obviously a lot of the parents are wealthy and powerful people, but not all of them, so you’ve got all that interaction going on, all that complexity. I remember my father’s story about his great friend, who became the Earl of Inchcape. His mother used to come down and visit them at Eton in the 30s in an open Rolls-Royce, and she was very glamorous, with her black jazz band lover in the Rolls-Royce with her. And this was in the 30s. So there’s always been an outrageous element going on at Eton. I was there from 1965 to 70, which obviously was a time of great social change and uproar: hair, the anti-Vietnam War movement, rock and roll, the Rolling Stones, drugs, the whole thing was going on, and it was going on at Eton too. It wasn’t like Eton was a sort of bubble. It was very much happening there and within the school.
Brian Rose: But you were a teenager then?
Simon Mann: Yes. Eton is 13 to 18, those five years.
Brian Rose: And all that kind of craziness was going on, because on the outside it looks like everybody’s walking around in full tails every day.
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: The suits with the tails. The top hats too?
Simon Mann: No, they went in the war, because they needed the silk for parachutes. Eventually, I think with a great sigh of relief, the top hats disappeared, but before that I used to wear a top hat to school.
Brian Rose: Wow. And yet still there was this counterculture element, because it was so cosmopolitan and cutting edge.
Simon Mann: Very much there, yes.
Brian Rose: People taking LSD?
Simon Mann: It was legal back then for a few years. That wasn’t really my scene, but it was certainly happening.
Brian Rose: And your father was a famous cricketer. Did you ever consider going that route?
Simon Mann: I was terrible at cricket. I tried very hard, actually, because my father and my grandfather both captained England. So obviously, as the eldest son, I was always destined to captain England at cricket too. But by the time I got to Eton it was very clear to me, if nobody else, that I wasn’t going to captain anything at cricket. I really tried, because that was what went on, and Daddy was still working in cricket. He was the big man; he eventually was chairman of the International Cricket Council and goodness knows what. Anyway, I got to Eton, I’d had enough of cricket, I knew I wasn’t any good at it, and I discovered the river, which was much more fun, so I took up rowing. Even in those days you were either a wet bob, who rowed, or a dry bob, who played cricket. Once you got into the upper realms of the school you could be something called a slack bob, which meant that you merely played golf or tennis or athletics.
Brian Rose: Did any of your children go to Eton?
Simon Mann: No, none of them, sadly. Eton today, the standard is just fantastically high academically. Actually I suppose the two older ones might have done, but by then I was divorced, and I think my first wife, having been married to me, then divorced, then having married another Etonian, thought that she’d had more than enough of the place. So the boys didn’t go.
Brian Rose: What is the attitude of an Etonian? How would you describe it?
Simon Mann: Well, famously, Kingsley Amis said of Ian Fleming, who was an Etonian, that in writing James Bond, who was a fictional Etonian, Fleming had achieved the Etonian dream of effortless success. When I went down to Eton and was talking to the boys, because they asked me to talk there, I stole this story, and I said, of course we all know that success is never effortless, so maybe the Etonian dream is the appearance of effortless success. Even if it’s not effortless, it must look effortless if we can do it that way.
Brian Rose: So the champions at Eton make it look effortless?
Simon Mann: I don’t know if they really do. Like all these things, you can’t generalise. But what was immensely privileged about Eton when I was there was that it really was a broad church. If you were gay, if you were an artist, if you were a scientist, if you were an athlete, you could do that, you could be that, and people were. It was a big school, even then it was 1,200 boys, and it was extremely tolerant. There was no bullying. I never encountered any real bullying at Eton, which in those days was quite unusual compared with what one heard from other schools. What I think it was really good at, and maybe it has lost that a bit, is taking really rough academic material, such as me, and doing the best that could be done with that material. The differential, in other words: bringing somebody from being really pretty hopeless to being somebody who passed A levels.
Brian Rose: And you did.
Simon Mann: I did. Well, you had to, to get into the army.
21:16 Brian Rose: So let’s talk about the army. Is that something you always wanted to do, and what did your father think of that choice?
Simon Mann: That again is a slightly strange story, because my grandfather and my father both served in the Scots Guards, which became my regiment.
Brian Rose: What are the Scots Guards, for people who don’t know?
Simon Mann: It’s one of the regiments of Foot Guards, which are the Queen’s own troops, the household troops. The Foot Guards are the Grenadiers, Coldstream, Scots, Irish and Welsh, in that order of seniority. Then you’ve got the two mounted regiments, who are also part of the household cavalry: the Life Guards and the Blues and Royals.
Brian Rose: And these are kind of elite levels?
Simon Mann: They’re the Guards. They were always in the key battles, the great battles, and they guard the Queen, but they’re also regular troops. They don’t just guard the Queen.
Brian Rose: And you became one as well, but your family had a history.
Simon Mann: My grandfather was in the Scots Guards the whole way through the First World War, and my father the whole way through the Second World War. Miraculously, both survived. When I said I wanted to join the Scots Guards, my father took a very dim view. He didn’t want me to at all, because he said, well, we’re not professional soldiers. They just joined because of the Germans. They volunteered. A professional soldier was not looked on well. My grandfather and my father, in both world wars, did not like the professional soldiers they found telling them what to do. They took a very dim view of that. And then my father said, if you really want to join the army you can, but I really don’t think you should join the Guards in peacetime, because he had this idea that all the officers were Hooray Henrys, drinking too much.
Brian Rose: What’s a Hooray Henry?
Simon Mann: A toff with too much money and not enough to do. Something like that.
Brian Rose: So it’s a class division? The professional officers are still usually upper class?
Simon Mann: Now we’re getting into quite tricky territory. In the Guards, traditionally the officers were. When I joined the Scots Guards, I think half of the officers’ mess were Etonians, and that had been the case for a long time. It’s not so much the case now.
Brian Rose: All right, so you joined anyway. Rebellious?
Simon Mann: Rebellious, yes. By that time I knew I wanted to get into the Special Air Service if I possibly could.
Brian Rose: And why was that?
Simon Mann: When I was at school they were engaged in Borneo, in Oman, in Aden, in the Radfan, all sorts of things going on that I knew about.
Brian Rose: Who are the SAS, for people who don’t know?
Simon Mann: The Special Air Service was begun in 1941 in the Western Desert by David Stirling. It was a special regiment whose objective was to go behind enemy lines and do as much damage as they possibly could to strategic targets.
Brian Rose: One of the very first special forces?
Simon Mann: The first of its sort in any major military, I think. Delta in the States is the closest American equivalent, and those two forces today are very close. They’re very good friends, often on similar deployments and often working together.
Brian Rose: And then later the SEALs came, which was the Navy version.
Simon Mann: I don’t think it was actually later. I think the US Navy had the SEALs going way back, and you have many different levels of them as well. Their equivalent in the UK is the SBS, the Special Boat Service, but they’re tiny compared with the American outfits.
Brian Rose: But the SAS is this elite force, and you were interested because you wanted to push yourself? It was exciting?
Simon Mann: It just sounded like it was the best thing, so I thought, if I’m going to join the army, that’s obviously the place to try and go. But more importantly, my cousin Lachie Maclean was in it, so when I was at school I knew what they were doing, and I really wanted to emulate him. He was a hero. He was at Eton as well, and I knew him quite well. He’s now Sir Lachlan Maclean, the head of the Clan Maclean, living up on Mull in Scotland.
Brian Rose: Wow. And was he knighted?
Simon Mann: No, it’s a baronetcy, so it was inherited.
26:40 Brian Rose: And was it difficult to get into the SAS?
Simon Mann: It is difficult.
Brian Rose: What does it require?
Simon Mann: I think the best way of putting it is the way it was put to me when I asked my friend who had been in it. I said, how do I get in? Can you give me some tips and a bit of mentoring? He looked at me and just said, if you want to get in, you will. You’ve just got to want to get in. But that actually means you have to want it really, really badly. The selection is such that any idea that the reason you wanted to get in was because you thought it was romantic or sexy is going to do you no good, and that disappears in the course of selection, because it is hard.
Brian Rose: We’ve seen BUD/S, Navy SEAL training, their kind of hell week scenarios. We’ve watched that on television. Is there a British equivalent for the SAS?
Simon Mann: I haven’t actually watched that. There is a bit of what I call “sickeners”, where they put you through things basically just to sicken you. But in the actual selection itself, test week, you’re on your own, so it’s all up here: do you really want to keep going or not?
Brian Rose: What do they do to you?
Simon Mann: Obviously you’re not entirely on your own, because you’re moving across the Welsh mountains, the Brecon Beacons, getting checkpoint to checkpoint, and your speed has got to be up to a certain speed, and you don’t actually know what that speed is, so you’ve really got to keep going. Unlike in the army, nobody is saying well done and nobody’s saying badly done. That’s very hard when you come from the army, where everything is being looked after and you’re being shouted at: “Get a move on, man.” “Well done, man.” There’s nothing like that. You’re suddenly in this psychological vacuum of no encouragement and no criticism. Just: okay, where are you now? Your next place is here, show me on the map. That’s extremely disorientating. As you go through the week your rucksack is getting heavier and heavier, you’re getting more and more tired, and the weather is probably worse, and by the end of it you’re thinking, why did I want to do this? That’s the point at which lots of people fail.
Brian Rose: Did you watch people quit?
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: What was the hardest part of all that training?
Simon Mann: It then goes into another phase, which is called continuation. You’re still not badged; you don’t get your badge until the end. The jungle phase is hard, because they’re not looking at you in terms of your determination, which you’ve shown on test week. They’re looking at you in terms of your ability to get on with a small group, work together as a team and achieve things in the jungle. You’re training, but you’re under close observation, and as an officer you’re being looked at in a different way to how the men are being looked at. You’ve got to not only fit in, but you’ve also got to be able to command as well. So then you’re getting into subjectivity. When you’re doing the hills in Wales, it’s all on time and distance: can you basically hack it? That’s objective; either you make the time or you don’t. In the jungle there’s a thing called officers’ week, and that’s subjective, so you start second-guessing yourself. You start thinking, what are they looking for? And that’s not a good idea.
Brian Rose: What jungle were you in?
Simon Mann: Belize.
Brian Rose: So they just flew you all down there for jungle training.
Simon Mann: Yes, and that is not a nice jungle.
Brian Rose: So there’s nice jungle and not nice jungle?
Simon Mann: Oh yes, very definitely. Belize is hellish jungle. You can be down to 200 metres in an hour, chopping; a kilometre a day maybe. It’s hard, and it’s all secondary jungle, because the main civilisation there was cattle based and they cleared a lot of the jungle. So the light comes down; there isn’t a canopy. In good jungle there’s very little ground cover, the canopy’s all up there, and you can walk quite quickly through it. Not in Belize. And that also means you’ve got feral cattle around, which means parasites, beef worms, in the jungle, just waiting for a British soldier.
Brian Rose: Splashing and cursing.
Simon Mann: Yes. Yummy, yummy.
32:38 Brian Rose: It sounds like quite a time. So you make it into the SAS, and from there probably the next big thing you do is your stint in Northern Ireland. Is that right?
Simon Mann: Yes. I did my tour as a troop commander in the SAS, and at that time our operational role was Northern Ireland.
Brian Rose: For people who don’t remember, what was it like back then?
Simon Mann: When I did my SAS tour, I think it was my fifth or sixth; I’d already been to Northern Ireland four or five times, I can’t remember exactly how many, with the Scots Guards. So Northern Ireland was not foreign territory at all. I had already operated in Northern Ireland, sometimes not in uniform, sometimes covertly, hiding in the bushes pretending to be a bush. Doing it with the SAS was not that different. There was a level up in terms of the way everything was done, the level of intelligence we were operating with and all of that, but it wasn’t totally foreign territory.
Brian Rose: And your job was just spying on the IRA at that point and trying to predict their moves?
Simon Mann: We would rather shoot them, because actually we weren’t the intelligence gathering arm, although we did do some of that. We were meant to be the executive force: either shoot them or arrest them, preferably with their weapons on them, so they were caught red-handed, so to speak. That was the whole game, the intelligence game: trying to catch them when they had their weapons.
Brian Rose: Because that’s the problem with urban warfare: you can’t tell the difference between them and a civilian.
Simon Mann: No. And also the guy can say, unless you’ve got something on him, “What’s wrong?” Whereas if he’s carrying a weapon, then obviously something is the matter.
Brian Rose: What do you remember most from those days?
Simon Mann: Northern Ireland always depressed me. The first time I went there with the Scots Guards I wasn’t even 21. I was 20. An old Etonian 20-year-old with 30 Glaswegians under my command in Northern Ireland: what could possibly go wrong? But it just depressed me. It was an awful situation, a horrible business.
Brian Rose: Was it a religious war or an economic war?
Simon Mann: Sort of colonial, more than anything, I think. The religion was obviously a factor, but it wasn’t really about the religion. It was about who’s in charge.
Brian Rose: And you started learning about terrorists and that term. What does it mean? Because those were the first “terrorists” you saw.
Simon Mann: Well, that was the thing. For example, Lurgan, which is where I was on the first tour I did with the Scots Guards in 1973, absolutely reminded me of my hometown, Newbury in Berkshire. Similar size, nice high street, WH Smith, people going about their business and their lives, and then suddenly bang, a bomb going off and people being killed. It just seemed very close to home. It felt like this is happening at home.
Brian Rose: And some of that was happening in England as well.
Simon Mann: Well, it started to. At that time it hadn’t really started, I don’t think, but later on, yes, bombs in London and so on.
Brian Rose: And how do you deal with terrorists?
Simon Mann: Shooting them is a good place to go if you get the chance, but that’s obviously not the only thing. What I think you have to do is address terrorism at every possible frequency of the spectrum. So yes, you have to go after them militarily and police-wise, but at the same time you have to acknowledge the fact that there is a political element to this. They may even be right. What the terrorist is doing is not right, but his cause may have some justice, and you’ve got to address that. Then you’ve also got to do all the good things of trying to separate the terrorists from their support base, which is probably a civilian one. Why are the civilians supporting the terrorists? I think the correct way to deal with terrorism, because one thing a government can do is address terrorism at every point on a very broad spectrum, and that is one thing the terrorists can’t do. They don’t have the power that a government does: TV adverts, the message in the school, the messaging in church, the message in the shops, the message on billboards, the police work, the intelligence work, the special forces work and the soldiers on the street. The whole panoply of life is addressed against terrorism. That’s the way to do it, and it has to be coordinated.
Brian Rose: Is that what England tried to do in Northern Ireland?
Simon Mann: Yes, but with many mistakes and many false starts and false moves along the way. Not simple. Malaya is the great example of where they first got their heads around the need to have a really coordinated, broad spectrum of action: the police, the army, the local community leaders, everybody on the same page all the time.
Brian Rose: Do you think we could learn lessons today from that same philosophy? Are we dealing with terrorists correctly today?
Simon Mann: I think those lessons have been learned, and they have been applied. From what I gather, that is what people have tried to do. But if it’s somewhere like Afghanistan, you are dealing with something so intractable that it’s almost impossible to change the minds of everyone there, to get the whole message across everywhere, up in the mountains, up in the tribes, when you’re dealing with something very extreme. And armies don’t solve social problems. The British Army was sent to Northern Ireland basically to stop the Protestants from burning the Catholic estates to the ground. Great, an army can do that. But if that army stays on the ground, then very quickly it isn’t the solution; it’s a part of the problem. Armies are not good at that, and that’s the story of what happened there. I think it’s happened in many places.
Brian Rose: Definitely with US troops, for sure. What was the worst thing that happened to you in Northern Ireland when you were there?
Simon Mann: Coming on to a bomb scene immediately after, seeing civilians killed, things like that, bodies ripped up.
Brian Rose: Wow. So you spent years over there?
Simon Mann: Yes, I did five tours. I worked it out: three years actual time there.
Brian Rose: I guess you learned a lot.
Simon Mann: Yes. But also at that age you’re learning and growing up anyway. It’s probably not the ideal place to do it.
41:18 Brian Rose: I know your mother was South African. Tell me about your relationship with Africa, personally and then militarily.
Simon Mann: Sure. So we were brought up half South African. Mummy and Daddy met on the boat in Cape Town harbour. Daddy was the returning victorious England cricket captain, so Mummy didn’t stand a chance. I think that’s why he was able to sweep her off her feet. So we were very much brought up thinking we were half South African, half English, which in those days was quite a cool thing to be. The boys at school who were half New Zealand, half Australian, half Canadian, half English, always had a little bit of a swagger, at prep school anyway, because lots of those boys were quite good athletes. Not that I was a very good athlete, but there was a bit of a swagger about it. And we visited South Africa quite often to see my grandparents.
Brian Rose: What are your memories of South Africa? How would you describe it to someone who’s never been there?
Simon Mann: I suppose it would depend on where the person I was talking to came from. Australians find South Africa quite familiar, and vice versa, and Americans would too. It’s got a highly developed infrastructure. You don’t feel as if you’re in a third-world country in South Africa. It’s got big problems at the moment, but there’s a road system, there’s a rail system, the airports are great big airports. You don’t feel as if you’re in a little struggling African country. And it’s not jungle; it’s the Highveld, so it’s very open, wide, very beautiful. The Cape is amazing. There are some incredible mountains, and the sea. Stunningly beautiful.
Brian Rose: Yes, I’ve been there a few times. It’s beautiful. Tell me about the military experience in Africa. How did that start, and how did it morph into private contracting?
Simon Mann: That is a strange story. Basically I rejoined the British Army because of the first Gulf War. I worked for General Peter de la Billière, who was our Gulf War general. I was on his staff, and when he left, that was the end of my job. This was actually 92, because he stayed on and I stayed on with him. I was offered a very good job back in the Special Air Service, which was very nice. At the same time my very good friend Tony Buckingham said, no, no, no, you can’t do that. He was actually jealous of the job, but he said, you can’t do that, because it’s time you made some proper money. I’d been working with him a little bit. He was setting up a new oil and gas company, a tiny one, with a project in Angola, and I’d been instrumental in helping Tony get into Angola in the first place. He said, come and join me. So I did, and that was May 92. Then in Angola there had been a whole long story, the huge civil war. The biggest proxy war of the Cold War was carried out in Angola.
Brian Rose: The biggest?
Simon Mann: Yes. With Russian and Cuban troops assisting the MPLA, the Luanda government, and America and the South Africans assisting UNITA, General Savimbi.
Brian Rose: And why was that proxy war there? Because of all the oil reserves?
Simon Mann: I guess so, and it just became a massive battleground: tanks, jet fighters, artillery. This wasn’t a little bush fire. This was a full-on punch-up.
Brian Rose: It doesn’t get talked about very much.
Simon Mann: No.
Brian Rose: But a lot of casualties, a lot of dismembered people from that war.
Simon Mann: Oh yes, terrible. There are huge battlefields that you can still fly over, and you don’t want to walk through them because there are mines all over the place, and there are massive burnt-out tanks everywhere. It’s not a guerrilla war. This was a full-on war, with South African armed forces fighting Cubans, and there were CIA people on the ground and Russians on the ground.
Brian Rose: Wow. Like a mini Afghanistan in that same period of time.
Simon Mann: But bigger, because in Afghanistan you don’t have tanks on both sides. This was tank versus tank fighting. So that all then got a peace agreement: everybody out, all foreigners out, and an election. And UNITA, having promised that they would abide by the result of the election, and the election having been judged free and fair by the UN and so on, went back to war. The first thing they did was attack a place called Soyo, which is a small town and oil company operating base on the mouth of the River Congo, which was our operating base, Heritage Oil and Gas, Tony Buckingham’s oil company. And Tony said, well, Simon, I think that’s the end of our company, because we’ve only got one project and this is it, and we’d better start looking for new jobs, both of us. So we sat there talking about it, and we said, well, maybe what we could do is fight, not accept this. Maybe we could take back Soyo from the guerrillas.
48:23 Brian Rose: It was your idea?
Simon Mann: Initially, yes. We had this discussion and Tony rang the Angolans, and three weeks later we were in Luanda and they said, right, you’re on.
Brian Rose: Who said you’re on?
Simon Mann: It was the head of the Angolan armed forces, General João de Matos, and Joaquim David, the head of Sonangol, the national oil company. And they said, you’re on, and we will pay.
Brian Rose: They’ll pay you to fight for your own oil company?
Simon Mann: Well, they’ll pay us to do what we proposed to do, which was retake Soyo.
Brian Rose: Because that was in their interest as well.
Simon Mann: Absolutely.
Brian Rose: And they couldn’t do it?
Simon Mann: Apparently not.
Brian Rose: Was this a first for Africa, paid British military people doing this kind of work?
Simon Mann: Well, we weren’t British military people. We were an oil and gas company. And it’s certainly not the first case of people being paid to do stuff in Africa. There were many, many other incidents: Rhodesia, Mozambique, the Congo, Biafra, over 20, 30, 40 years.
Brian Rose: How did you feel when he said you’re on?
Simon Mann: It was actually very funny, because in the middle of the meeting they said, so what are you going to do? Tony looked at me and said, well, you’re the soldier. And we had no idea what we were going to do, because we had no information as to how many enemy troops there were in Soyo, what they were armed with, or what the Angolans were able to give us in terms of resources, because we weren’t going to walk up there with 60 people. So I said, well, General, I think what we’ll have to do is a classic Special Forces coup de main. And everyone looked at me: very good. A coup de main is a blow of the hand. It’s completely meaningless. “A classic Special Forces coup de main”: excellent, action. Anyway, we got out of the building, we were walking back to our hotel, and Tony said, okay, smartass, now what do we do? And I said, don’t worry, because I had made some preparatory phone calls to South Africa, where I knew South African special forces guys, and I’d got some numbers off them, roughly what guys cost and this kind of thing, so we had some idea of costs.
Brian Rose: And you were in Angola at the time?
Simon Mann: Yes, in Luanda, a safe area. So then we flew down to Johannesburg on the president’s jet, and got spotted at the airport by some of my old colleagues, who said, “Nice aeroplane, boss.”
Brian Rose: Immediately. It’s very hard to keep things quiet.
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: These are old colleagues from the SAS?
Simon Mann: Yes, and they were down there doing a mining security job. They were all at the airport. So Tony said, well, that was really covert, wasn’t it? And I said, presidential jets tend not to be very covert.
Brian Rose: How much of this is a rush? You enjoy the adrenaline. This must have been fun.
Simon Mann: If you’re in your thirties, of course it was fun.
Brian Rose: You’re flying on the presidential jet, you’re about to invade.
Simon Mann: Well, we think we are. But we’re also thinking, we’ve heard this stuff before. Are they going to pay up? Probably, the Angolan government, but we said you have to pay a deposit, and we’re not going to start running around hiring people until we get a deposit.
Brian Rose: What’s the going rate for retaking a city for the Angolan army?
Simon Mann: This was a long time ago. I can’t remember the exact numbers.
Brian Rose: Is it like a million dollars?
Simon Mann: Oh no, it was more than that. It was going to cost more than that, much more.
Brian Rose: Fifty million and a bonus?
Simon Mann: No, but big chunks of money. Five million to do it and five million bonus after it’s done, something like that.
Brian Rose: These are big numbers for a guy who was probably making 30 grand in the army. How does that feel?
Simon Mann: Except this money isn’t all coming to me. We’ve got a hundred people to pay.
Brian Rose: You’re the dealmaker, you’re now an entrepreneur.
Simon Mann: Tony is the dealmaker. Tony’s incredibly funny, very good fun, and his background is oil and gas. He’d had a bit of military training here and there, but he was basically a saturation diver from the North Sea.
Brian Rose: How did you know him?
Simon Mann: I knew him because we had the same lawyer, who was a friend of both of us.
Brian Rose: Why did you need a lawyer?
Simon Mann: I was in business. I had had businesses in the 80s, a computer security business, a cybersecurity business. Anyway, so we then get to Centurion, which is halfway between Johannesburg and Pretoria. We meet up with Eeben Barlow, Lafras Luitingh, Nic van den Bergh, Tony and me, and we say, right, guys, there’s a job, and we think we’re going to get the money. If we do get the money, can you do the job? And we have a sort of planning session: yes, they can do it. Tony and I basically didn’t want to be that involved. We wanted to be the Mr Bigs: you go and do the job, we’re going to pay you, we’re going to supervise, we will handle the Angolans for you, but you have to do the job.
Brian Rose: Because it’s dangerous. You don’t want to be involved.
Simon Mann: Well, we actually had a big argument about that. I said, well, obviously we’ve got to go on the ground with them, and Tony said, no way are you going on the ground with them, and so on. And then Eeben Barlow said, well, I’ve got a company, because there was a big complication with the money in South Africa, foreign exchange controls and so on. Eeben said, I’ve got this off-the-shelf company which has never traded, but it has all the right bank permissions for money to come in and money to go out. Can we use that company? And Tony and I said, yes, sure. What’s the company called? He said, it’s called Executive Outcomes. We said, okay, funny name, but yes. So then we were waiting for the money to come, and then it did come, and we were going, oh my goodness, these guys mean it.
Brian Rose: So they paid a chunky deposit?
Simon Mann: A chunky deposit. I think it was 400,000 US dollars or something.
Brian Rose: And then you interview soldiers? How do you know who’s the real deal? This is pre-internet, pre-email.
Simon Mann: Well, the guys I knew had been South African Special Forces, and I knew that even if it wasn’t them, they would know the people who would and could. It was all a bit of hidden lists. And so three weeks later we were all in Angola, and five weeks later, with three thousand Angolan troops whose average age I think was about fifteen, we attacked Soyo.
Brian Rose: So fifteen-year-olds with AK-47s and no training?
Simon Mann: And no training.
Brian Rose: And then what, thirty special forces guys?
Simon Mann: We had sixty. Sixty of us and three thousand kids.
Brian Rose: And you attacked Soyo.
Simon Mann: Yes. And there were, I think, three thousand or so UNITA troops, and they were good ones, and they were expecting us, and they had some mercenaries too. We never really got to the bottom of that.
Brian Rose: How were they expecting you?
Simon Mann: They knew we were going to attack, because word gets out. This is Africa.
Brian Rose: There’s that expression: TIA, This Is Africa.
Simon Mann: Well, I think it’s true anywhere. But it was a very extreme situation, because actually the FAA, the armed forces, had been specifically formed by recruiting people out of the old army and UNITA. So there were UNITA people within the headquarters with whom we were working. It was a classic situation of there being no strategic surprise whatsoever, so the necessity was therefore to create tactical surprise. We were not going to suddenly appear and surprise them, because they knew we were coming.
Brian Rose: So how did you create tactical surprise?
Simon Mann: We managed to get helicopters assembled, which no one thought we would. General de Matos, the Angolan general, and I working together, Tony and I persuaded them that the only way to do this was with helicopters.
Brian Rose: How many helicopters?
Simon Mann: We had four Mi-17s and two Mi-25 gunships, which was just about the entire helicopter fleet of the whole of Angola.
Brian Rose: How do you negotiate these deals? I’m picturing drinks at some hotel bar, or lunches at the palace with the president.
Simon Mann: We had nothing to do with the president. Of the Angolans, the one who was really driving the thing, partly because he was fluent in English, was Joaquim David, the head of Sonangol, the national oil company. That is the source of all of their revenue. Joaquim David had been a captain in the Portuguese parachute regiment back in the day, because remember, until 1975 the Portuguese were fighting in Angola against the rebels, the nationalists.
Brian Rose: Right. Because they controlled the country.
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: All right, so you go in with helicopters and fifteen-year-olds against an equally matched force that might also have some mercenaries. From what country?
Simon Mann: South Africa, same as us.
Brian Rose: Same as you. And you are not on the ground with them? You decided not to be?
Simon Mann: No. Although in fact Tony and I both went in. We took them in.
Brian Rose: What does that mean?
Simon Mann: Well, in my case, one of the things when you’re launching people in helicopters is you want to be absolutely sure that where you’re going to land a helicopter you’re not flying into an ambush or a trap. So we had to put some people in to have a look and then radio the all clear during the night before. The helicopters were going to come in at first light, and I took in two recce patrols that we launched off an oilfield support vessel in the night. It all sounds more dramatic than it really is; it’s very standard procedure. Then the helicopters came in at first light, and the 3,000 arrived in this great big landing craft ship, which had tanks on it as well, and it immediately broke its stern anchor. When a landing craft comes in on a big swell, it’s got to drop an anchor off the stern, run in onto the beach and then pull in on the anchor, otherwise the boat will broach in the surf. Well, the anchor rope broke, and it did broach, flooding the tanks and a lot of the ammunition with sea water. And this is going on under fire. The helicopters have landed their guys, so there’s a firefight going on there, and there are a couple of guys firing at the boat I’m in, which was trying to look innocent.
Brian Rose: Just oil industry; we just happened to be here.
Simon Mann: That’s the thing, which they didn’t buy. And this boat leaning over on the beach: quite scary. The whole thing, you can imagine, was very dangerous, and the South Africans were just amazing. So then we ran the thing from Cabinda, which is on the other side of the mouth of the River Congo, 20 kilometres away from Soyo, but was the nearest place where we could mount the necessary logistics: food, water and ammunition going in, and casualties coming out.
Brian Rose: And how did the battle end up going? How long did it take?
Simon Mann: It’s hard to know, but it probably took, I should think, six days before we believed we were winning.
Brian Rose: Wow. How do you keep fifteen-year-old kids fighting over six days? Are they doing it for money?
Simon Mann: Oh no. They’re doing it for survival by that stage. This was serious fighting, hand-to-hand fighting, hand grenades, grenade distances.
Brian Rose: There’s nowhere to run at that point.
Simon Mann: Not really, no. It’s a fight for survival. There’s a peninsula, but we always kept that. In fact, I remember saying to Tony, I think we’re winning. He said, what do you mean? I said, well, because the helicopter crews are wearing their uniforms. It was the first day; up till then they’d all been wearing plain clothes, so if a helicopter crashed or was shot down and they had to go on the run, they were not in uniform. When I saw them in flying suits I thought, aha, morale is improving.
Brian Rose: All right.
Simon Mann: But it was a logistical battle, like all of these things, because UNITA were on a hugely long logistical line of march from where their headquarters were. So every round of ammunition and every casualty for them was a massive logistical issue, whereas for us it was a helicopter issue.
Brian Rose: And that’s what won the battle, you believe?
Simon Mann: What really won the battle was the quality of the South Africans leading them, the actual soldiers themselves. This is an interesting point about the whole Executive Outcomes story. Those South African soldiers had been fighting, many of them, for ten years. They were South African Special Forces. They had been fighting what the South Africans called the frontier wars, in Namibia, Angola and Mozambique, and they were very, very good. And they were just at the point where they were coming out, because the white government of South Africa was coming to an end. Remember, this is 92, so Mandela and everything is about to happen, and the South African Defence Force was literally tearing up people’s pensions. So this is my point when talking to other people about PMCs and the Executive Outcomes story, because people are fascinated by the story, and they say why not do it again: you’ve got to put this into context. It just happened that these amazingly experienced, battle-hardened guys were suddenly on the market, extremely available and extremely pissed off with their own establishment. And also remember that all of this is happening in part because the Berlin Wall has just come down and the Cold War has ended, which is why the white South Africans have been told to release Mandela and get on with one man, one vote. Because the whole issue was the Simonstown naval agreement. The one thing the West was not going to tolerate was Simonstown being a Russian naval base.
Brian Rose: Because it’s at the Cape.
Simon Mann: Exactly, because if the Cold War is still on and you’ve got a Russian fleet in Cape Town, the world is cut in half. They can dominate the whole Cape passage.
Brian Rose: So there are lots of underlying geopolitical things happening here.
Simon Mann: Absolutely. Until the Cold War ended, apartheid was tolerated. The moment the Cold War ends, they’re told, forget it. But then that also caused a vacuum, because no one knew how the world was going to go after the end of the Cold War. Well, now what are we going to do? We’re not now engaged in this great struggle against the Soviet Union. And that created a sort of vacuum, because with Tony and me doing what we were doing, people were like, what are you guys up to? Whose side are you on anyway? The MPLA are backed by Moscow, and you’re fighting for them against UNITA, who were backed by the CIA in the old days. And we were saying, well, we don’t really care. We’ve got a business, somebody attacked us, so we’re attacking back.
Brian Rose: So you’re providing a service that’s needed, and you’re a businessman at this point.
Simon Mann: It’s our livelihood, our property, our men, and we’ve been attacked, so we’re not going to just disappear. We’re going to fight back.
Brian Rose: But even you found the whole thing ludicrous at the time, that you were actually doing this and it was happening?
Simon Mann: Ludicrous is probably the wrong word. I did have to pinch myself and think, this is really extreme.
Brian Rose: But were you enjoying it?
Simon Mann: Enjoy is the wrong word. I was a professional soldier for many, many years, and here we were in a real ding-dong straight out of a Wilbur Smith novel. So yes, there were definitely elements of great excitement and derring-do. And it nearly failed. I flew the recce in a Sukhoi two-seater over Soyo before the attack, taking photographs. I didn’t have a life jacket, I didn’t have an ejector seat that would have worked, and there was a lot of stuff being fired at us.
Brian Rose: Even when you’re doing the recce?
Simon Mann: Oh yes. And then on the same sortie we went and shot up a whole load of UNITA positions, and the pilot couldn’t actually speak English, and I just had this sort of periscope: where are we going now? So the jeopardy was extreme. That was a real adventure. And sadly we did lose a couple of our guys at Soyo.
Brian Rose: South African special forces?
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: What’s that like, to lose someone that you respect, that you’ve hired, better soldiers than you thought?
Simon Mann: That was very shocking, actually, in the sense that I hadn’t expected to feel quite the way I did when it hit me that we were not doing this for Queen and country. We were not doing this as the instrument of an elected government. We were doing it for money, or at least they were. I could argue that I was doing it in self-defence: this is my business, I’m going to fight. But they weren’t; they were just doing it straight for money. So somebody badly injured or dead just for money was more shocking than I expected it to be.
Brian Rose: But again there’s that weird blurred line of where it’s private and where it’s public, when it’s for the Queen and when it’s for money.
Simon Mann: It’s always blurry. Well, we enrolled everybody. I was actually a general in the Angolan army.
Brian Rose: Really?
Simon Mann: Oh yes: badges of rank, uniform, ID cards, everybody. Because I said this is what we must do so that we’re not mercenaries. Legally, if you shoot somebody dead, what’s the basis for doing that if you’re not a soldier in the armed forces of an army? You could be accused of murder.
Brian Rose: So you were a general in the Angolan army?
Simon Mann: I was, and so was Tony.
Brian Rose: I’m so glad I had you back on, because it always gets better when I talk to you. Did you retire as a general? Are you still a general in the army?
Simon Mann: I don’t think so, no, because they were extremely angry when I tried to do the 2004 thing.
Brian Rose: All right, we’ll get to that.
1:12:27 So to finish this off, you ended up being successful.
Simon Mann: Well, we won this battle for Soyo, and two months later, in the aftermath of it all, they came back to us and said, listen, guys, that really was spectacular. That was amazing. So we got all our money; they paid the balance.
Brian Rose: So they paid everything.
Simon Mann: Yes. And they said something actually very interesting. They said, you’re the first bunch of white guys we’ve ever come across who did exactly what they said they were going to do, and we haven’t had a single complaint from any of your men that they haven’t been paid or that they’ve been treated badly. Not one. We’ve never had that before. We said, okay, well, that’s good, glad to hear that. And then they said, and we are losing the war. Can you help us win it? Tony and I had, you can imagine, a big debate about that, and we decided that we would help. So a month later we all met at a game farm in northern Namibia, where the Angolan generals could fly in and we could fly up and we could all meet in secret.
Brian Rose: Very Wilbur Smith.
Simon Mann: Very Wilbur Smith.
Brian Rose: For people who don’t know, those are the adventure books.
Simon Mann: Very African, that covert thing. They’re very famous, actually, but it probably ages me rather a lot that I’m even talking about them. And we then presented to them how we could win the war with them, and they accepted our proposal. There was debate and negotiation and so on, but they basically said, okay, guys, and a month later they said, right, you’re off.
Brian Rose: And I’m guessing this price tag was significantly higher.
Simon Mann: Well, yes, not least because as part of that contract we ended up with eight hundred or a thousand men in Angola.
Brian Rose: Executive Outcomes people, highly trained soldiers. So this is hundreds of millions of dollars?
Simon Mann: No, not hundreds of millions, but significant.
Brian Rose: Because there’s a lot of oil at stake.
Simon Mann: Angola is an incredibly rich country. But also, a thousand men under arms is an expensive thing.
Brian Rose: How do you source the talent?
Simon Mann: Very easily, really. South Africa at that time was perfect. We actually had three thousand men on the books, in addition to the thousand, who wanted to join Executive Outcomes and had been screened.
Brian Rose: So at that point you were the biggest private military contractor in the world, and maybe in the history of the world?
Simon Mann: Well, maybe Hannibal was bigger, or the East India Company. The British East India Company: does that count? So arguably. But at that time we were by far and away the most powerful private military people. People weren’t using the term PMC then, actually.
1:15:58 And then we got involved in Sierra Leone while Angola was still going on.
Brian Rose: Just because you had some extra time?
Simon Mann: It’s a bit of a story, but we discovered there was a terrible war going on in Sierra Leone, and they had this amazing diamond mine. So Tony and I went up there and we saw Captain Strasser, this young guy who was the president of Sierra Leone. They were losing the war against the RUF, and we offered to help him. In fact we actually paid for what we did in Sierra Leone out of the profits from Angola, believe it or not, because Sierra Leone had no money.
Brian Rose: But you were promised the mines if you won?
Simon Mann: It wasn’t quite that. It would be nice to think that was how it was done, but it wasn’t actually. Obviously if you get a licence to a mine like that, it has to hold water. It can’t be some sort of backhander. It has to be officially awarded after a proper tender and so on. Anyway, we did a proper tender and we won.
Brian Rose: So you got into the mining business in Sierra Leone.
Simon Mann: Actually we got into the mining business first in Angola, and that was what then prompted us to look at Sierra Leone.
Brian Rose: And how did the war go in Angola with your thousand guys? You brought something the army couldn’t bring, which was expertise.
Simon Mann: Yes. We formed a sort of crack unit of 600 guys, like a battle group: armoured vehicles, supporting artillery, supporting helicopters. That was primarily our guys, bolstered with some Angolans. In the meantime we had 200 people training up two more units of 600 each. Once that had happened, which was a two-month process, we had a brigade of three battle groups, a proper brigade, and UNITA just didn’t have anything that was really capable of taking that on. There were a couple of battles which we won. We then did some other things. We intercepted one of their aircraft, because UNITA’s entire logistics was being flown in from South Africa, still, and we intercepted one of their supply flights, which basically meant that all the supply stopped. And then I went to Russia to deal with the Russians, representing the president of Angola. I had a letter of commission from him, and my ID card as a general and all that.
Brian Rose: So you went to Russia as an Angolan general to buy arms?
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: Was the US watching you the whole time? How did they feel about you?
Simon Mann: I think they were pretty pissed off with us.
Brian Rose: Did they try to take you out?
Simon Mann: Well, if they did, they missed. But I think I was in more danger in Moscow, probably.
Brian Rose: In danger from the Russians?
Simon Mann: No, from all sorts. There were many factions running around at that time. This was 1994. I think thirty Western bankers were shot dead in the streets of Moscow. It was a rough place at that time, so anything could happen.
Brian Rose: What do you remember about that trip?
Simon Mann: Just determination to try and get these things.
Brian Rose: Bombs, surface-to-air missiles?
Simon Mann: No, they were bombs. Bombs.
Brian Rose: Did any of this seem surreal to you while it was happening? Were you writing letters home saying, dear honey, this is what I’m doing? Were you telling anyone? Were you thinking about the major motion picture describing your life? Because this is crazy, adrenaline-packed, fantasy stuff you’re doing.
Simon Mann: No. I just thought, wow, this is wild.
Brian Rose: You loved it.
Simon Mann: Yes. I remember Tony and I sitting there and Tony said, Simon, do you realise we’ve completely pissed off the CIA, Big Oil, the white South African government and De Beers? All four are really, really cross with us, because all four wanted UNITA to win.
Brian Rose: De Beers, the massive diamond mining company.
Simon Mann: Yes, and we’d upset them big time. Because I actually think that those four restarted the war. I think those four pulled UNITA back into the Angolan war when it restarted: De Beers, the CIA, the white South African government and Big Oil. They wanted the war to start again because it was in their interest for UNITA to win, all for different reasons, and De Beers wanted the diamonds not to be coming out.
Brian Rose: Were you loving the money, the excitement, the power? What were you loving about this?
Simon Mann: Well, I hadn’t actually made any money at that point, or no time to spend it, sort of thing. It was all happening, and it was very nice to think that I was earning some money, definitely. But I was also quite sort of supportive of what we were doing, because I felt that UNITA were completely wrong to go back to war. The country had been at war for 30 years.
Brian Rose: It’s mind-blowing. So you were in the right, or you told yourself you were in the right?
Simon Mann: I told myself that we were in the right, because not only had we been attacked, but also these people had signed an agreement and made promises that they would never go back to war, and had gone back to war, plunging an entire country of ten million people back into hell. So we thought, right, we’re going to see what we can do.
Brian Rose: But at other times in your career, didn’t you back people who had done similar things, gone back on their word? Like in Sierra Leone, going against an election?
Simon Mann: Sierra Leone was a no-brainer, because the enemy was the RUF, Foday Sankoh, and they committed the worst atrocities. Just horrific, absolutely horrid.
Brian Rose: Like what?
Simon Mann: Cutting pregnant women open when they were betting on the sex of the foetus, when they entered a village. Really, really nasty.
Brian Rose: Was it a local militia war, the RUF?
Simon Mann: They were a strange bunch of adventurers who thought they could take over Sierra Leone. Many of them were boy soldiers, a lot of drugs involved. A lot of them were from Liberia, and therefore experienced in the civil war there. Completely mad. Liberia takes it to the next level, with eating babies and things like that. So these were Liberians, and they just have a different mentality in Liberia, which is very extreme.
Brian Rose: Why is that, in Liberia?
Simon Mann: It had just been going on for so long. And there’s the strange history of Liberia: this is where freed black Americans went back to after the Civil War in America. It was an idea; it’s called Liberia, “the free”, and the capital is Monrovia because the president of the States was Monroe. It’s a very strange place. We used to have a joke that if somebody produces a really nice diamond in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, it walked from Sierra Leone, and if somebody produces a real problem in Sierra Leone, it walked from Liberia. Diamonds go one way and big trouble goes the other. That’s just the difference between those two places.
Brian Rose: It is amazing.
Simon Mann: Because one of the first mercenary-type things that happened to me was actually in Liberia, back in the 80s.
Brian Rose: And what was that?
Simon Mann: There’s actually a very funny story there. There’s an iron ore mountain in Liberia which is one of the richest in the world. There’s a railway line that runs from the mountain to a place called Buchanan. It’s one jetty and a railway line, and this mountain is so rich in iron ore that if you fly over it in a light aeroplane, your compass starts going like this. Anyway, I was hired by a guy called Emmanuel Shaw, who was the finance minister in the Doe government. Doe, with Charles Taylor, who appears later in many people’s stories, fighting against him as the rebel leader. I was hired to reopen the railway line, because the rebels were becoming a problem, and Emmanuel Shaw, as well as being finance minister, owned the mine, obviously. But by the time I got there, the rebels were approaching the capital, Monrovia, and there was no way the railway was going to be reopened. Shaw and I tried to persuade Doe to hire some people to save the situation. I always remember, because it was getting very dangerous, and instead of being a big shot I was actually sleeping on Shaw’s balcony as a bodyguard with a submachine gun. He came back from the president one night and said, Simon, I think we’ve got to leave. I said, what do you mean? Where are we going? He said, we’re getting out of here, because it’s time to go. I said, well, did the president not like our plan, or didn’t he listen? He said, no, the president is listening to two blacks and only two blacks. I said, what are those? He said, black magic and Black Label, and that’s not a good combination, and it’s time we left. And we escaped the next day, because Shaw, although he was a minister, had an armed guard who were meant to be his escort, but in fact they were also there to make sure he couldn’t escape.
Brian Rose: So how did you get out?
Simon Mann: He had a light aeroplane. There are two airports in Monrovia, a little one in the middle and then the main one, and there was the inevitable Israeli pilot, who of course was Mossad or connected, no question, and he was the pilot of Shaw’s Beechcraft Baron, a nice little Baron. We spent the day maintaining it and passing beer and cigarettes to our escort, and as it got dark Shaw came through the garden, through the airport fence, we put the aeroplane back together, and off we went.
Brian Rose: And what happened to the man with the black magic and the Black Label?
Simon Mann: He was killed, famously, [unclear] to death, the president, tied to a post, soon after.
Brian Rose: Wow.
Simon Mann: And that’s Liberia for you. That was Liberia. Anyway, so the RUF were a very nasty bunch, an extremely nasty bunch, so one had no moral compunction about dealing with them at all. If you go to Sierra Leone today, they will say, oh no, don’t criticise Executive Outcomes. These are the guys that saved us.
Brian Rose: You actually liberated the mines from the RUF.
Simon Mann: We beat the RUF militarily, and then we were asked to leave, which we sort of half did, and then we were asked to fully leave. The RUF then came back in, in force, and at that point Tony Blair got involved and sent the British Army in, but that was quite a lot later.
1:29:42 Brian Rose: Now how does Executive Outcomes get wound down? Do you finish the war in Angola?
Simon Mann: Well, the FMA, the Foreign Military Assistance Act in South Africa, of 1998. That was it; it had to stop.
Brian Rose: It wouldn’t allow any former soldiers to be mercenaries?
Simon Mann: It was specifically aimed at Executive Outcomes. The ANC were told, we don’t want a continent where there are private armies running it.
Brian Rose: And you’d been doing this for four or five years by then.
Simon Mann: Yes, and it was well known what had happened. In fact there’s a very good soap in Johannesburg, a TV soap, and we knew we had really made it as an organisation when they had to write somebody out of the script. Some actor had to be taken off the soap, so he joined Executive Outcomes and was never heard of again. Not a phone call, not a letter, nothing. Gone.
Brian Rose: That’s cool. That’s how people saw it. What did Executive Outcomes look like around 97, 98? You’re doing big things, you’re making money. Are you living in South Africa or Angola?
Simon Mann: No, by then I was just doing a circuit of London, Johannesburg, Luanda, Freetown. I was running the mining, and I didn’t really want to, because I’m not a mining professional. I ended up running the whole mining thing because our mining manager was killed in a light aircraft crash at Entebbe, and Tony said, look, Simon, you’re the only person who knows all the people involved, because we wanted mining licences, so you’ve got to run it. Take one for the team, kind of thing. So I did, but I didn’t really enjoy that. I said, okay, I’ll do it up to the rally, because in the meantime Tony and I had entered the Peking to Paris motor car rally, and we drove an Aston Martin DB5 from Peking to Paris, just for fun.
Brian Rose: So you’d made a lot of money at this point.
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: And you’re driving from Peking to Paris. What did your old army buddies think of you? They must think you’re mad, they must be jealous. You’re by far the most successful member of your class at Eton, of your class at the SAS. At home, are you famous? Are you infamous? Were you in the papers in London?
Simon Mann: No. In fact the annoying thing is that throughout the whole Executive Outcomes story, Angola and Sierra Leone, I was almost completely below the radar. Tony Buckingham did get known a bit. Executive Outcomes was well known. Eeben Barlow, who was the face of Executive Outcomes, was very well known, and it was his company in the first place, the off-the-shelf company. So I’d managed to basically escape all of that.
Brian Rose: Which was good or bad?
Simon Mann: That was good.
Brian Rose: Because then governments would be looking for you?
Simon Mann: It wasn’t so much that. I just didn’t want the fame.
Brian Rose: But you were the military brain behind it all.
Simon Mann: I wouldn’t say that. To give you an example, the senior Executive Outcomes officer in Angola was a guy called Nic van den Bergh, a South African general. He’d been to staff college, he had fought in the wars, so he was a senior professional soldier, and he was running the thing in Angola. In Sierra Leone we had Bert Sachse, ex this, ex that, ex the other, Rhodesian war and South African wars, and he was the colonel running Sierra Leone. So we had really professional people. What was I actually doing? I suppose I was a sort of staff general, going round and talking to the customers, who were the governments of the two countries, and basically acting as the link man between the senior Executive Outcomes people, the senior people of whichever country it was, and London. That was my job, basically making sure it all happened.
Brian Rose: What was in London? The company?
Simon Mann: Yes. We had an office down the King’s Road. It was incredibly funny: we had the prettiest secretaries and the most lovely office, and it was like a sort of schoolboy atmosphere, with people’s bicycles in the hall.
Brian Rose: Would heads of state drop by? Would people come to hire you?
Simon Mann: Nobody hired us as such, but I suppose people did come and talk to us about things.
Brian Rose: Is there anything else we should say about the Executive Outcomes years and all the stuff you did in Africa that I didn’t cover?
Simon Mann: Well, there’s a massive amount about it, actually. There are a number of books, and my part of the story is nothing compared with, for example, what some of the soldiers saw and did. By the time Executive Outcomes was at its height, with something like 1,600 or 1,800 people, only 10 or 15 percent of those guys were white. Most of them were actually black soldiers, South Africans who’d fought in the South African wars, many of them from 32 Battalion, Buffalo Battalion. There’s the whole story of the South Africans recruiting Angolans to fight in Angola, in the proxy war time. It’s a very convoluted story. Some of those guys’ stories are far more interesting than mine.
Brian Rose: Because they were on the ground?
Simon Mann: They were actually on the ground doing the fighting, and some of them went from Angola to Sierra Leone to the Congo and then to Papua New Guinea in the Pacific, and then to prison with me later.
Brian Rose: All right, we’re going to get to that.
1:36:42 While we’re on the topic, and closing out the private military contractor idea: what do you want to say to people who are listening to this and have judgements about private military contractors? Should the US use them, or other countries around the world? How do we understand this?
Simon Mann: I think if we take the capitals away and just say private military contracting has always happened and will always happen. There will always be situations where X or Y or Z service or need required by the armed forces is actually supplied by a private company. That might be maintenance, it might be medical, it might be logistical, it might be this, that or the other thing; it might be security. And I think there’s nothing wrong with that.
Brian Rose: Because it’s more cost efficient, and that’s where the better professionals are?
Simon Mann: Yes. Famously, when the Royal Navy sailed to take on the Bismarck, there were civilians on board the ships, working for a company, and now they’re fighting the Bismarck. So they are private military contractors, aren’t they? Then you get into slightly less well-defined areas, where the private military contractor is carrying out things which are likely to lead to them being in combat. Let’s say they’re armed and they’re guarding an embassy or a perimeter camp in a place where there’s likely to be an attack. Then they are quite possibly going to be fighting. But if they’re any good, they’re going to say, wait a minute, what we should be doing is sending out fighting patrols to dominate the ground around us. Bad soldiers just sit there and wait to be attacked. Good soldiers go out there and try and find the attackers. But now what are you doing? Now you’re not a guard; now you are a soldier. And at that point I think it’s far better if that is carried out by people who are actually enrolled in the armed forces.
Brian Rose: Why? Morally, because they’re dying for a reason?
Simon Mann: It’s not so much that. It’s what is the basis of your actions. Because I can tell you that the business requirements of profit do not mix well with military decision-making. Do we have four helicopters or do we have three? We all know, sitting around the group, we ought to have four, because the mathematics are such that we need four: if one’s broken and one is on a mission, we need a fourth in case we have to casevac somebody. That is the life-saving helicopter. But we can get away with three. Now if the cost of the fourth helicopter is coming straight out of your pocket, what are you going to do? You see what I mean?
Brian Rose: Oh yes.
Simon Mann: That’s probably not even that great an example, but all sorts of military decisions are going to be made with the profit factor imposed, which is dangerous.
Brian Rose: It is dangerous.
Simon Mann: And if you shoot somebody, what’s the moral basis for that? Is that murder or isn’t it? If you’re under the rules and regulations of the American army or the British army, then you might have murdered somebody; there are rules of engagement. But that whole machine that you’re in comes with the moral authority of a democratic government. So people say to me, wait a minute, you started Executive Outcomes, you went and did what you did in Angola and in Sierra Leone. How can you possibly sit here and say it’s much better done by the state? And I say, well, everyone likes an analogy: if I’m walking down the road and there’s a house on fire, I think, that’s terrible. And if the guy comes running out, I’ll say, okay, we’ll help, but that’s a hell of a big fire. I’m going to have to get some of my men and equipment in to help put it out. Will you pay us? Yes, yes, yes, quickly, the house is on fire. Okay, guys, job here. Great, we put the fire out, we get paid. None of that means that I don’t think it’s much better if the municipality has a proper fire brigade. So where was the fire brigade in Angola and Sierra Leone? The fire brigade was meant to be the United Nations, and in both cases they were absolutely useless. This is where Erik Prince and I do agree: we did what needed doing when nobody else was doing it, and we did it very well, at almost no cost compared with a Western government doing it.
Brian Rose: And this is referring to the work Blackwater did, probably in Baghdad, protecting personnel?
Simon Mann: I’m more referring to Erik talking about, for example, his proposal for Afghanistan, where he is very specifically saying, look, we can do this job, we’re going to cost far less and we’ll be more effective. Now I would actually disagree with that part, because I’d be saying, wait, are you really saying that we can’t, as a country, use our armed forces properly? That we have to go and hire people? Because this is what the armed forces are for. But in the case of Angola and Sierra Leone, the fire brigade was actually sitting on their backsides eating meatballs, or whatever the Swedish contingent of the UN in Angola does. The UN, invariably, whenever you see them, is a huge exercise in self-administration. They don’t do anything.
Brian Rose: And you offered a service to get the job done, and no one else could do it, and you did it.
Simon Mann: We did it, and the UN complained and reported us, and then asked for a lift down to Johannesburg for the weekend. True story. Which we gave them, of course.
Brian Rose: You’re too nice.
Simon Mann: So I think when it comes to actual soldiering, it’s much better if it is the state that does it, and I think that saying, oh, well, we can do it better, is ridiculous. We must be able to do it at least as well as a private outfit, surely.
Brian Rose: I don’t know. Maybe if the private outfit is motivated by money and streamlined by that, and not bureaucracies, maybe in the future they can do it better. But I know there’s a moral conflict.
Simon Mann: As a British soldier I’d say I think that’s ridiculous. We must be able to do it at least as well. But there is also another element here I’d like to bring out, which is this. Let’s go with Erik and say, right, he can set up a company and go in and do a job with X special forces guys, and it’s going to be cheaper and better done than if the actual special forces do it. But where is he going to recruit the guys from, and where will he recruit the next generation of guys? He’s going to say, well, we need to hire everyone who’s just left. But why are they good? Because they’re experienced. So if you’re going to do the next job, you’re not training people. You’re not taking an eighteen-year-old, putting him into the United States Marine Corps for five years, then making a SEAL out of him, so that ten years later he is the unbelievable product that he is, and then Erik comes and hires him. Now I’m the taxpayer and I say, hey, wait a minute, those were my tax dollars that paid for those 15 years of that guy, and now Erik’s going to hire him and then send me the bill.
Brian Rose: You make a good point there. It’s not sustainable.
Simon Mann: And it’s not cost-effective if you look at the bigger cost. I just think it’s fundamentally skew-whiff. So when I get asked now, which I do get asked by people in Africa, what would you suggest, because they are dead against the PMC model now, and they’re very cautious when they talk to me about it, I say, well, firstly I think the PMC model is not the right one. And they say, really? Good. What is the right one? Because with the whole Iraq invasion and the whole PMC scene following that, and all the subsequent things that have happened in Afghanistan and some things in Somalia and Puntland, PMCs have become a bit like drones: you mention the word and a lot of developing world countries just go, oh no, we don’t want that. I think there’s a better model. It’s actually all about having a really experienced, effective group at the core of a national army in an undeveloped and perhaps rather chaotic country, and you can do that by using what’s quite a French Foreign Legion model. If we take a random country, let’s say Nigeria, why can’t Nigeria have a foreign legion as part of its armed forces? The French did; the British have the Gurkhas. You build within your own armed forces this very select, very capable group, which has everything it needs organically and which can be the tip of the spear, basically.
Brian Rose: So like an internal PMC that’s aligned with the values of the country?
Simon Mann: And is part of the armed forces, genuinely. It’s not like me turning up because I know the right general. It’s really a part of it. We were actually part of the Angolan forces in a pretty genuine way.
Brian Rose: So that’s what you recommend. And do people listen to that?
Simon Mann: Yes, but doing it is another thing in Africa. There are a number of states, and I’m not going to list them, that are looking at options.
Brian Rose: Why did Blackwater get in trouble?
Simon Mann: I wasn’t there in Iraq and I don’t know, but I have a lot of friends who were there, and I think they were recruiting some really second-rate people.
Brian Rose: Deputy sheriffs from the Midwest?
Simon Mann: Gun club type people, who were out of control. They hadn’t got the experience, they hadn’t got the proper training. Some of the guys out there are incredibly professional. They’ve spent their entire lives in the regular armed forces of America or the UK or France or wherever, and then they’ve gone into special forces, and those people are extraordinarily able and experienced. They don’t panic, they don’t get frightened and make a bad decision.
Brian Rose: Start shooting civilians.
Simon Mann: Right.
Brian Rose: And that’s what happened with Blackwater: they had some bad incidents, and then people saw the PMC and everyone kind of freaked out. Money’s now involved in war, everyone starts asking questions and it spins out of control.
Simon Mann: I think that’s what happened, but I don’t know. I wasn’t there.
1:50:18 Brian Rose: Okay, that’s helpful. I think we should move on and talk about what’s next, because if you didn’t think this was enough of a story, it continues.
Simon Mann: Oh yes.
Brian Rose: Because we now get to the final chapter, the longer chapter, which is the failed attempted coup. So maybe tell us, from 98 to the attempted coup in 2004, what was happening and what led up to it.
Simon Mann: After we’d done the motor car rally, I took the family down to Cape Town. We lived in Cape Town from November 97 until 2003.
Brian Rose: No more war?
Simon Mann: Well, there was some stuff going on. So Sandline: the arms to Sierra Leone scandal, which ended with Robin Cook being dismissed.
Brian Rose: Sandline was a British company?
Simon Mann: It was one of our companies.
Brian Rose: And that was Britain giving arms to Sierra Leone to fight the RUF?
Simon Mann: My friend worked with Sandline. It was an offshoot of Executive Outcomes, or more accurately an offshoot of Tony Buckingham and me, in a sort of Executive Outcomes manifestation, and Tim Spicer was arrested over arms to Sierra Leone. The fact that the United Nations were helping unload the aeroplane that the arms came in should have been a clue that this wasn’t a bit of gun-running.
Brian Rose: So what was going on?
Simon Mann: Sandline was trying to supply weapons to the good guys in Sierra Leone, with the blessing of the British government. But Robin Cook, the minister, it eventually turned out, had signed off the briefing document in his red ministerial box without having read it, because he wanted to go away for the weekend. That was his undoing, because in the end he was forced to admit that yes, he had signed the document, and had he read it he would have known that this was a government-backed operation, government approved. So that was the end of him. And in the midst of all that, I recall, Tony Blair, I think very admirably, said, wait a minute, this is all ridiculous, because what we should be worrying about is not trying to take Tim Spicer to court, when clearly we as a government were involved. What we should be doing is helping the people of Sierra Leone. Which he did, and he sent the British Army there, and thank God, they made some peace down there. That was the end of the RUF, once and for all.
Brian Rose: And we heard that story told in the movie Blood Diamond.
Simon Mann: The Blood Diamond story is sort of Hollywood getting our story completely back to front.
Brian Rose: How so?
Simon Mann: Because in the movie the bad guys are the South African white mercenaries, whereas actually it was the South African white mercenaries who saved Sierra Leone, and they will tell you that very quickly. Tony and I are still friends with the president, and there’s a great amount of goodwill towards us in Sierra Leone.
Brian Rose: Would you ever do business there again?
Simon Mann: I’d love to. I haven’t yet.
Brian Rose: All right. So you’re down in Cape Town, still in the business. Executive Outcomes was closed down, but there’s still stuff going on, just not direct military like it was.
Simon Mann: We had the Papua New Guinea saga. There was a contract to retake Bougainville Island from the guerrillas, actually the islanders, who had taken over and wanted to secede the island from the state of Papua New Guinea. Sandline was hired to take it back, and it was the same characters again. In the middle of all this, the general in charge of the Papua New Guinea armed forces got jealous and mounted a coup against the president and locked everybody up, including Tim Spicer, and sent everyone home. Huge scandal. The head of Australian intelligence was fired, because they said, how could you possibly not have noticed the largest Russian transport aeroplane in the world landing twice at Port Moresby and unloading Mi-24 gunships? Which they’d failed to notice.
Brian Rose: And Sandline was involved in that. That was yours as well. But you don’t make money off things when they don’t go well.
Simon Mann: Well, actually we did make some money from that, because it was a breach of contract. It’s a whole story, but not very much money. So that’s the stuff that was going on. Then I got recruited by somebody called David Hart to help him try and make sure that the invasion of Iraq happened, which I did as best I could.
Brian Rose: How did you help him?
Simon Mann: He was writing papers that were going to Number 10. He’s dead now. He was writing papers that were going to Number 10 to lobby, basically, for the invasion.
Brian Rose: And how did you help him?
Simon Mann: He had never been in the army. He hadn’t got any military experience at all. In fact that was my question to him at lunch at the Ritz. I said, David, why me? He said, well, you were in the army, the SAS. And I said, David, there are about twenty people within a mile of here who were also in the army and also in the SAS, much more senior and better qualified than me. So why me? He said, ah, that’s true, but they haven’t fought and won two private wars. So what I was doing for him was this. He said, right, how do we make sure that this happens? I want ideas, and I want you to write them up, and then if I like them I’ll incorporate them in what I’m writing, which is going to Downing Street. And that’s what I did.
Brian Rose: And what did you tell him?
Simon Mann: There were two ideas that we came up with. One was a sort of flag-raising exercise, whereby you basically pick a place in Iraq, go and take it over, raise the flag and say, come and get us. But we’d make sure that it was under the US air support umbrella, so it would give Saddam a terrible choice.
Brian Rose: So the British go in there and raise a flag and say come and get us?
Simon Mann: But it’s actually going to be a kind of private force of Iraqis, Iraqi émigrés. There were something like 20,000 of them in the United States, under a guy called Ahmed Chalabi, again now dead, and he was going to come in with me.
Brian Rose: You were going to go in as well?
Simon Mann: Yes, and we were going to take the whole Executive Outcomes crew with these 10,000 or whatever Iraqis.
Brian Rose: You’re in your fifties now, and you’re still game.
Simon Mann: So basically Saddam has to make a choice. Either he has to leave us there with the flag of rebellion flying high, or he has to send people to sort us out, in which case they’re going to come under the entire weight of the United States Air Force, which would not be fun.
Brian Rose: All right, so that’s idea one. And the weapons of mass destruction hadn’t been talked about or discovered yet?
Simon Mann: No, they were being talked about, absolutely.
Brian Rose: But you were giving him military options.
Simon Mann: Yes. It wasn’t my job to point out anything more or less useful than that.
Brian Rose: Do you ever have ethical questions when you’re advising a government on how to start a war in another country, or do you just think, that’s what I do?
Simon Mann: The answer’s no, if I’m honest with myself. I know that probably sounds completely mad, but on the one hand I think, well, I’m a professional soldier, they’ve asked me to do this, this is the UK that’s going to do this with the United States of America if it’s going to happen. And at the same time I’m also thinking, I wonder if they’re right to be doing this. I think that’s normal. It was the same in Northern Ireland: I’ve got a job to do, I’m going to do it, but what are we really doing here? I think any soldier is used to this, that you’re constantly living with a potential conflict within yourself. Both of my oldest sons went to Afghanistan, both loved it and did very well, and both said, but Dad, actually it was complete crap really. We shouldn’t have been there. So I think this is quite a normal thing, except when something really outweighs it, like when your general is telling you to shoot civilians, and you have to say, okay, now I really have to act. Then that is completely different.
Brian Rose: All right. So raising the flag was one option. I’ve got to hear the second option. I really wonder what people are talking about when they’re having lunch at the Ritz now. Whenever I see two guys in suits, I’m going to be thinking about this. And this stuff still goes on today, right? On the eastern front of Ukraine, in North Korea, people are gaming these ideas.
Simon Mann: Syria, the places of conflict, Somalia, South Sudan, potentially Libya. There’s stuff going on all the time.
Brian Rose: So what was the other idea?
Simon Mann: The other idea, which I actually personally rather liked: we get a rusty steamer, a crappy old cargo ship. We buy it in the Far East, we sail it round to Pakistan, we load some actual nuclear bits from Pakistan, which we buy, and we then sail it into the Gulf. We’re intercepted by an Iraqi patrol boat, which we sink, killing all the crew, and we sail along with our contraband to Basra, at which point the balloon really goes up, because there are genuine nuclear bits and pieces in Basra and there’s been murder and mayhem on the high seas. Off we go.
Brian Rose: What did they think of that?
Simon Mann: Well, I only had David Hart’s word for the response, but the response he gave me was that they really liked this. They were just not very sure about the source. But I think that was David engaging in a bit of creativeness. Of course we wouldn’t have killed the sailors; we’d have captured them and pretended that they were killed.
Brian Rose: And people watching this might be appalled by this brazen lack of sticking to the truth, or to international protocol. Do you say, grow up, this is how it works?
Simon Mann: I wouldn’t say that. I would say, look, we’re just building castles in the sky here. People want ideas. They want to know how this could be done, and it’s my job to come up with the ideas. So there you are.
Brian Rose: But one of those could easily have been executed. Instead they “found” weapons of mass destruction, which was probably the third idea.
Simon Mann: Except they didn’t.
Brian Rose: They didn’t. That was probably the ludicrous third idea. And I guess that’s less violent.
Simon Mann: Well, I don’t know enough about it, but I actually think that Saddam believed he had weapons of mass destruction, because I think he’d bunged vast sums of money at his generals to buy them or make them, and I think he’d been told that they’d got them. So I think he thought he had them.
Brian Rose: Even more perfect.
2:04:03 All right, let’s talk about the coup. How do you get involved in a coup d’état of Equatorial Guinea? Attempted.
Simon Mann: Attempted. I was recruited by somebody called Ely Calil, who’s also dead.
Brian Rose: It’s quite funny how quite a few of these people are no longer with us. When they’re dead, do you feel more comfortable talking about things?
Simon Mann: Actually, libel. The UK laws of libel are very strict, but you have to be alive. If you’re dead, you can’t be libelled.
Brian Rose: Okay.
Simon Mann: So Ely Calil recruited me. He was a Brit, but a Christian Lebanese born in Nigeria, and a multimillionaire.
Brian Rose: And what was the plan?
Simon Mann: The real plan was that there would be a palace coup, so the president would be arrested in his bed, and we would fly in with the chairman of the interim cabinet designate, a gentleman called Severo Moto, who had been the elected mayor of Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea, so somebody with real standing in the community. We’d have put him in, and we would have been the escort: 60 men, the right number of men for a VVIP escort in a dodgy place. And that was it.
Brian Rose: That’s a pretty standard escort for a dodgy place, 60 men?
Simon Mann: For a VVIP, for getting in and out, for the first couple of months.
Brian Rose: And you expected the palace coup, which means they just arrest him in his bed at night.
Simon Mann: Yes. I was expecting to arrive in Malabo wearing a suit and a tie. I was not expecting to wear combat kit, but obviously we had to have combat kit just in case something had gone wrong.
Brian Rose: And even then, how do 60 men fight their way…
Simon Mann: Exactly. That in itself is really the proof that it was the palace coup that was expected to happen. I was expecting that we were going to arrive at the airport and be greeted and met by the committee.
Brian Rose: Now why take this on? Did you realise how risky it was?
Simon Mann: I knew it was potentially very, very risky, especially as initially I didn’t know the real plan. Ely Calil just said, well, I think we ought to take over this country. And how are we going to do that? You need to meet Severo Moto, and so on and so forth.
Brian Rose: And the real plan was even riskier?
Simon Mann: Well, no. The real plan, the palace coup, is nearly risk-free. We’re just going to land, we’re going to be met by some people, they’ve got the president under arrest, they’re going to say, hooray, here’s the new guy, our liberator, Señor Moto, and I’m just making sure poor Severo doesn’t get whacked or shot or something like that. So that’s quite gentle. Obviously things might subsequently happen. The army may decide they don’t like Severo Moto, all sorts of things might start happening. And initially I said, well, I don’t know. I need to find out how bad the dictatorship is, because to me, and I’m not trying to be moralistic here, this is being pragmatic, I want to know that the dictatorship, the tyranny, is horrible, because that’s our excuse.
Brian Rose: That causes us to believe. It makes it easier to get the job done.
Simon Mann: Much easier. In fact I said to Ely Calil, it is essential.
Brian Rose: It’s a cynical…
Simon Mann: Well, no. If it turns out that the tyrant is not really a tyrant, that he’s a benign dictator, then I’m not interested, because it’s going to fail, it’s destined to fail, and also it’s morally wrong.
Brian Rose: So you do have moral issues.
Simon Mann: Of course. I thought I’d made that abundantly clear.
Brian Rose: You were sinking an Iraqi patrol boat, killing the sailors.
Simon Mann: But remember, they weren’t really going to be killed.
Brian Rose: Of course. And it wasn’t really nuclear material.
Simon Mann: No, it would have been. It would have had to be.
Brian Rose: Okay, understood.
Simon Mann: But it never got into the realm of the real. It might have been fake. Probably other people would have interfered.
Brian Rose: I just think there’s a Simon Mann in every government around the world, maybe multiple ones, coming up with these ideas over lunch, and some of these play out into what happens in the world, some we hear about and some we don’t, and there’s something very terrifying about that.
Simon Mann: I think that’s normal. I’m sure you know that military staffs around the world spend weeks actually planning wars against people who are their friends and allies, on a what-if scenario planning basis. It’s an exercise. We’d better have a file.
Brian Rose: Again, this is a civilian’s perspective: I just want to sleep well at night and do my job and not think about it.
Simon Mann: But this goes back to your first question: should the guy going around the supermarket be aware or not?
Brian Rose: I think you should. Or are we here spreading uncertainty and fear and loathing? Should we be having this interview?
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: I think the person should know. I think they should thank the officers for their service. I think they should be aware that you’ve got to do some bad things to have a peaceful society.
Simon Mann: Well, I don’t think we do bad things. If we do from time to time, then they have to be done. But I don’t think people have to be running around ever grateful. I just think that’s a bit American.
2:10:46 Brian Rose: All right, so back to the coup. Margaret Thatcher’s son Mark was involved.
Simon Mann: He was, because there was a money play here. That was latterly, because I was running out of money, and I needed some more money, because Ely Calil, who said he had lots of money and was going to back the whole thing properly, failed to do so.
Brian Rose: Does it take millions of dollars to do this coup?
Simon Mann: Not that much. I think we probably spent about three million. But that was badly spent, because what Ely Calil did, which I warned him not to do, was basically drip-feed us. Had he come up with the five million I wanted on day one, when he said we’d have it, then it would have been a very different story.
Brian Rose: What do you need that money for?
Simon Mann: Paying people, buying kit and setting up the mechanics.
Brian Rose: Of the 60 people going in.
Simon Mann: Well, for example, the first thing I said to Ely Calil was, I don’t even know if this tyranny is a tyranny, so I want to put some people on the ground to find out. So Nick du Toit, who was a South African and my number two, went onto the ground and spent a lot of time and effort in Equatorial Guinea building up contacts. He set up a couple of businesses, an ice-making business, a fishing boat and so on, which was cover, and that was our reconnaissance. One of the crucial things that Nick had to do was report back to me and tell me how bad it was. Is it a horrible tyranny or isn’t it? And he reported back unequivocally that it was awful and there were terrible things going on. People were being sacrificially eaten; street boys were being taken off the street and used for sexual purposes, and so on and so forth. It was really, really bad.
Brian Rose: Which is kind of a normal day in Liberia, but…
Simon Mann: That bad, yes. Really bad. Wrongful arrest, people kept in prison for no reason, all of that.
Brian Rose: But otherwise, were there no resources, no wealth in Equatorial Guinea at the time?
Simon Mann: There was huge oil wealth at the time, absolutely. A very wealthy place. And Ely Calil was saying, look, we can create a Dubai out of this. We can get rid of the tyrant and have a democratically elected government. We’re not going to interfere with the oil industry at all, because if we do we’ll be very unpopular, and we’re going to make a lot of money out of real estate.
Brian Rose: And that’s the way it works in the mercenary business sometimes: I’ll pay you later, we’re going to make money later. Sometimes it works, with diamond mines in Sierra Leone, and sometimes it doesn’t.
Simon Mann: That’s right.
Brian Rose: How would you have been paid in the end?
Simon Mann: Well, we would have been the Praetorian Guard around, hopefully, the new president. But there are a great deal of ifs. This is not like “we want half the money up front and half the money after the job, guv”. It’s not like an Ealing comedy crook thing. Anyway, Nick said this is absolutely horrific, and as the news came in as to how horrific it was, the thing built up, and I decided, yes, okay, we’ll give it a go.
Brian Rose: Do you talk to your wife before you do things like this?
Simon Mann: I did, actually, yes, on this occasion.
Brian Rose: And she knew everything you’d done before, pretty much? Was she for it?
Simon Mann: She keeps quite well away from it all; doesn’t want to know the details. She came to the meeting in the bush where all the Angolan generals flew in. She was actually there, so she saw some of it, and she sort of got a bit of a kick out of it.
Brian Rose: Like a sort of Bonnie and Clyde. I’d love to have been there. So this one, she had a bad feeling about?
Simon Mann: She had a bad feeling about it, and she did tell me not to do it, although on other occasions she’d said, well, maybe you should. But of course that came back to haunt me: I told you not to do that.
Brian Rose: Right. Does it still?
Simon Mann: It still does.
Brian Rose: You still have a remarkable sense of humour about this.
Simon Mann: That’s just age.
2:15:51 Brian Rose: All right, it comes down to the day and you decide to go for it. What is happening on the day?
Simon Mann: Things are bad. We’re on plan M, and it’s not a good one.
Brian Rose: A, B, C, D, E…
Simon Mann: We’ve been through a lot of plans. We know we’re blown all over the place. We know far too many people know what we’re doing. We’ve spent a year messing around in the build-up, which was way too long.
Brian Rose: Things will get leaked in a year.
Simon Mann: Absolutely. And we also knew that the South African government knew, and South African intelligence knew, and we knew that Spanish intelligence knew, because they were part of it. They wanted it to happen; they were behind it. Not literally, “here’s some money, go and do it”, but they were privy.
Brian Rose: What was the president of Spain called?
Simon Mann: I don’t remember. But they definitely all knew what was happening. The Spanish knew, the Portuguese knew. I think the Americans knew. I think the Americans had told Ely Calil, way before I was recruited: Ely, if you do this right, we’ll give you a fair wind. This conversation never happened. We’re not going to back you. We’re not having this meeting. But if you get it right, we’ll give you a fair wind, which means we’ll leave you alone. We won’t be agin you. Because Ely Calil was far too experienced and far too well known to the American and French services to think that he could do something like this and nobody would know and it was all going to be okay. He was a consummate operator.
Brian Rose: Gotcha. All right, so it’s plan M on the day, far too many people know, it’s leaked, you’ve changed the plan a bunch of times.
Simon Mann: We’re short of money. Now we’re really short of money.
Brian Rose: You don’t have the resources, which means you don’t have the fourth helicopter you were talking about. You don’t have all the backup plans.
Simon Mann: Well, in this case I bought the Boeing, the one that’s still sitting at Harare International, still sitting in the same place. If I fly in, I can see Simon Mann’s plane. I’m just waiting for the parking tickets to arrive. We had some very good plans as to how to do this, but we never had the money at the time to do those plans. So now we’re on a plan which is basically, for God’s sake, let’s just go to Harare, collect the weapons, fly to Malabo, and let’s hope.
Brian Rose: It’s like a seventh-grader’s plan. We’re just going to kick in the front door. Brute force.
Simon Mann: And remember, all the time, in the back of my mind, I’m thinking it’s the palace coup. For example, and this is something that nobody has ever really grilled me about in all the many, many interrogations: where were the weapons and the ammunition going on the aeroplane? Into the hold. So when you landed at Malabo, you’re all in the passenger part and the weapons and ammunition are in the hold. Had you test-fired the weapons? Checked them? Nope. So either you are all raving mad, or the palace coup is the real story, because nothing else would make sense.
Brian Rose: And the thing you’re alluding to is…
Simon Mann: There absolutely was going to be a palace coup, because if that wasn’t part of the plan, then what we were doing was madness.
Brian Rose: Okay, understood. All right, so you bought the Boeing plane. Why do you have to go to Zimbabwe to make this happen? You can’t fly from South Africa because it’s too crazy?
Simon Mann: No, we go to Harare to collect the weapons and ammunition. That’s what we’re doing in Harare.
Brian Rose: And you felt comfortable going to Zimbabwe normally, or was it a little risky?
Simon Mann: I’d only been there to do that. I’d been there four times with Nick du Toit, dealing with Zimbabwe Defence Industries, ZDI, which the government owned. We were meeting in the main boardroom, business cards across the table.
Brian Rose: You’re buying weapons. This should be simple; you’ve done this a million times before.
Simon Mann: Well, actually, Nick had done a lot of work with ZDI.
Brian Rose: And what happens?
Simon Mann: We go through the whole procedure, and everything seems to be fine. The Boeing comes in, the guys are on board, and we get taken to the hangar, where there is supposedly a truck with all our kit on it, weapons and ammunition.
Brian Rose: And you’ve got 60 South African mercenaries on board?
Simon Mann: They’re sitting in the plane. Myself and two guys go to check the ammo. The plan was to go directly from there to Equatorial Guinea, in one go, which may mean turning one engine off. It’s a 727, and it’s got three engines; it can easily fly on two.
Brian Rose: Why do you turn one engine off?
Simon Mann: To save fuel, because it’s a long trip. It’s at quite extreme range. And if the weather is bad and we have to divert for weather, that’s quite complicated.
Brian Rose: Is it like eight hours?
Simon Mann: No, about five hours or so. Anyway, we go onto the truck to inspect the arms and ammunition, and something’s wrong, and then I look up and we’re surrounded by 20 people in black overalls with MP5s. “Get down off the truck, you’re under arrest.” And we’re in prison. The guys in the plane were taken off after a couple of hours.
Brian Rose: And they can’t fight.
Simon Mann: No, they’ve got no weapons.
Brian Rose: And how are you feeling at this point?
Simon Mann: Not good.
Brian Rose: But you didn’t know it was necessarily really bad?
Simon Mann: I suspected it was.
Brian Rose: And what was happening?
Simon Mann: I don’t know for sure, but I’ve got some pretty good information now as to what was happening, and that basically says that President Zuma of South Africa, no, Mbeki, sorry, not Zuma, Mbeki, the then president, knew about the operation and had given it his blessing to go ahead, up until two hours before our arrest. Two hours. And I have that information from a very, very good source.
Brian Rose: Why did he change his mind?
Simon Mann: Again, I have information which I don’t know is true, but to the best of my knowledge, having talked to lots of different people: the Americans told the Angolans to tell the South Africans to tell the Zimbabweans to arrest us. Now you may say, why would anyone go down a chain like that? The Americans want to distance themselves as far away from this as they can, so they don’t tell the South Africans directly. They tell their good friends in Luanda to tell the South Africans that if they don’t blow the whistle on this and stop it, their fingerprints are all over it and they’re going to get the blame. So tell Zimbabwe to arrest them, which they did. Now you may say, wait a minute, I thought you said there was a conversation on the Beltway with Ely Calil and somebody saying, listen, Ely, this lunch never happened, but we’ll be calm, we’ll be cool, if you do this and you do it right. So why would they then be the people who torpedoed it? And in my mind’s eye I have this meeting room in Langley and some guys sitting there saying, this operation is going to hell in a handbasket. And everyone’s saying, yes, sorry, sir, it’s got a bit out of hand, hasn’t it, and this is getting very dangerous, because it looks as if our fingerprints are on it. And I’ll come back to that in a minute; there were a couple of terrible mistakes I made. And then, in my mind, it’s always a young lady who says, excuse me, sir, but surely there’s a way we can turn this all around and get a win-win. And she says, well, if we stop it, we can then go to the president of Equatorial Guinea, because what was our objective in the first place? Our objective was to get a better rule of law and a better government in Equatorial Guinea. That’s why we set out on this whole thing, to replace this guy. So why don’t we turn it around the other way and say to the guy, we’ve saved your ass this time, but we can’t do it again, and you have got to mend your ways, because you’re doing a whole load of things that are wrong and we know all about them. You’ve got to sort it out. And then we get what we wanted in the first place. “That’s a good idea. Make it so.” And then they go on to the next item. This is my imagination, obviously, getting completely out of control. But I like something like that, because otherwise it doesn’t make sense. And I know now that everything changed in Equatorial Guinea when the coup failed. That is the date that everyone I talk to in Equatorial Guinea tells me everything changed. Suddenly they started to put money into schools, hospitals, roads. They really started to work hard to make things better.
2:27:22 Brian Rose: All right. Meanwhile, you’re in prison.
Simon Mann: Meanwhile I’m in prison.
Brian Rose: In the capital of Zimbabwe. And what happens over the next few days?
Simon Mann: Not good, because nobody knew where I was. I’m in the hands of the CIO, the Central Intelligence Organisation of Zimbabwe, which is like Mugabe’s Gestapo, basically, and they’re being rough on me and they’re being rough on the men.
Brian Rose: What does that mean?
Simon Mann: Nothing too dramatic, no pliers taking fingernails out or anything like that, but kicks and beatings and roughness. And they’re frightened, because they don’t know what’s really going on. They’ve just been told, these white mercenary bastards.
Brian Rose: But you guys are obviously seasoned soldiers, and that’s probably strange for them.
Simon Mann: They don’t know what’s going on. There was a story that we’d come for Mugabe, so they thought we might even be his enemies. And then they’re interrogating me, and they know everything. They know absolutely everything, and I know from what they’re saying that they must have had a massive amount of information coming to them, which must be coming from South Africa. So after a few days of this I said to the head guy of the CIO, because I knew that the men were being really quite badly beaten up, because at one point we could talk next to the aircraft: look, you’ve got to stop beating everyone up. This is just ridiculous, because I will tell you everything you need to know. You’ve obviously got a lot of the information anyway. I’ll just tell you. I wanted what was happening to the men to stop. So I sat down with them and went through a whole statement. And after about six days they very nearly put me on a jet to Equatorial Guinea. That was a frightening moment. I was sitting in the car waiting for three hours, and they said, you’re going to Equatorial Guinea. Oh, that’s not going to be good.
Brian Rose: Because what would have happened?
Simon Mann: I think they’d have shot me at that stage of the game.
Brian Rose: And they were threatening to? You think they were actually thinking about doing it?
Simon Mann: This is what I think Equatorial Guinea would have done.
Brian Rose: And you think they were going to put you on that jet?
Simon Mann: I think it was real, but I think there was some wobble.
Brian Rose: Do they have a relationship where they control…
Simon Mann: None. They had never even heard of the place. It was hilarious, because they could only say “EG”. They’d never say Equatorial Guinea. They’d never heard of the country, because it’s so tiny, and it’s Spanish speaking, non-English speaking.
Brian Rose: All right, and then what do they do with you?
Simon Mann: Then I go to Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison, and I know that I’m not going to get fed to the crocodiles at that point, as in executed or disappeared. I know that I might be shot if I go to Equatorial Guinea, and I know they might hang me, though they don’t really want to, but I know at least I’m not going to get chopped up and fed to the crocodiles.
Brian Rose: Is that something they do?
Simon Mann: Yes. You just disappear, because nobody knew where I was.
Brian Rose: Nobody, meaning your wife and your business partners?
Simon Mann: They vaguely knew. Obviously some people knew I had flown there, the people in South Africa who were part of the plot. But they didn’t know where I was.
Brian Rose: So you’re thinking they might just make you disappear. Do they actually feed you to crocodiles, or is that just a term?
Simon Mann: No, they do actually feed people to the crocodiles. And they pretended to execute me down by the river the first night. I knew they wouldn’t, though. I knew that was just bluffing.
Brian Rose: You knew that, or you believed it? They take you down with a bag over your head?
Simon Mann: There was no bag.
Brian Rose: And they cock a gun behind your head and pretend to execute you?
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: And you convinced yourself it’s not going to happen?
Simon Mann: Well, I thought it was just so unlikely.
Brian Rose: Does any SAS training help here?
Simon Mann: I think it does, actually. You do a whole lot of combat survival training and you get interrogated by the interrogators.
Brian Rose: You must have done some interrogating in Northern Ireland.
Simon Mann: Actually, no. Informally, on the street, yes.
Brian Rose: But you knew the game, and you had done some role-playing.
Simon Mann: Yes, I knew the game, and I think that does help. You’ve learnt some things, they’ve talked to you, and some funny things stick in your mind, and just remembering them helps. It gives you points of reference.
Brian Rose: What happens next? Is there a trial?
Simon Mann: Oh yes, but that’s months later, three months later.
Brian Rose: So you’re stuck in this maximum-security prison.
Simon Mann: It’s nasty.
Brian Rose: Yes.
Simon Mann: It’s just horrible. And obviously all the time you’re thinking about what’s going on, family. Painful.
Brian Rose: A lot of solitude. What do you do?
Simon Mann: I walked. But after a while I had some books, and after a while I started writing a book.
Brian Rose: And they let you keep the paper?
Simon Mann: No, they kept on taking it away, which was very annoying. But in the end I smuggled the manuscript out of the prison. This was years later, after I’d written the book several times over, because they kept on stealing it. In the end I fooled them. They thought they’d stolen the book, but what they’d stolen wasn’t the book. The book was in my hiding place, and then it got smuggled out.
Brian Rose: And so what ends up happening?
Simon Mann: Well, there were appeals and deals, and all the time I sort of knew that Equatorial Guinea wanted me, I thought in order to execute me. And in the end they got me. They bought me.
Brian Rose: They bought you from Mugabe?
Simon Mann: Yes. They say for ten million in cash and seventy million in a soft oil deal.
Brian Rose: That’s a lot of money for one guy.
Simon Mann: And the guards knew. My nickname was Shumba. They said, Shumba, you’ve been bought and sold. The diesel on the street in Harare is for you. You’ve been sold. And my lawyer was saying, oh no, don’t worry, it’s all okay, the family have got this sorted out, they’re going to get you out, right up until the end. And then one morning I woke up at about three o’clock in the morning and the CIO were in my cell, and I knew immediately: here we go.
Brian Rose: How many years had you been there at that point?
Simon Mann: Four years.
Brian Rose: Four years. And the whole time you’re wondering what’s going on, and the guards know what’s going on? They know a deal is happening to get you extradited?
Simon Mann: I had guards who were sort of friendly.
Brian Rose: Why did they call you Shumba?
Simon Mann: I don’t really know. It means lion in Shona.
Brian Rose: So the CIO show up in your cell and you’re thinking, this is it.
Simon Mann: They’re going to take me. And then began a pretty unpleasant four days, when they basically smuggled me to Equatorial Guinea.
Brian Rose: Smuggled you?
Simon Mann: Yes, because they were kidnapping me out of the prison. It wasn’t legal. There was no legal process. It was rendition. It wasn’t extradition; it was rendition. They took me to a military police barracks, where they beat me, two nights there.
Brian Rose: Why were they still beating you?
Simon Mann: Well, that was very annoying. Having been a prisoner for four years, you’re in the prison and you’ve got respect. The other prisoners respect you, the guards respect you. It’s all quite cool.
Brian Rose: They respect you because of your background, or the way you are?
Simon Mann: No, it’s just the way the prison is. So suddenly going back into that whole thing was very annoying. And then they flew me down to Bulawayo, then onto a 737 to Luanda, of all places. After all that, I’m suddenly back in Luanda, the capital of Angola, to refuel.
Brian Rose: And of course you’re hoping, I’m the general. Can someone get me off the plane?
Simon Mann: I knew that the Angolans were really pissed off with me. But even so, I tried to bust out of the plane, because a British Airways plane was right next door. I could see it, a shiny Boeing 757 or whatever it was, all immaculate, and I just thought, oh man, if only I could get to that. I tried to fight my way out of the plane, which failed, not surprisingly.
Brian Rose: And why would the Angolans be mad at you?
Simon Mann: Because they had a sort of proprietary interest in me, I think, me being one of their generals. So they were really cross that I’d tried to overthrow their friend, the president of Equatorial Guinea. In the early months of my time in Zimbabwe they sent a team over to interrogate me.
Brian Rose: Were they nasty?
Simon Mann: They weren’t violent, but they weren’t very happy.
Brian Rose: So you can’t get off the plane.
Simon Mann: I couldn’t get off the plane. I laughed at myself. I thought, God, you really are in trouble if you’re trying to get arrested in Angola. Because I thought, even if things go horribly wrong and I fall out of the back door of the plane, they can’t leave me on the tarmac. They’re going to have to arrest me.
Brian Rose: Which would be the best thing that could happen to you.
Simon Mann: Well, then at least I’ve been in an Angolan jail, the British consul will know about it pretty quickly, and wheels might start turning. But it was not to be. Next stop, Malabo. And I was fully expecting that when I walked down the steps, which was a pretty slow process because I was in handcuffs and leg irons, and by this time they’d done the leg irons up so tightly, and you know how you swell on an aeroplane, so it was pretty painful…
Brian Rose: Is there an interview of you when you walked down, any footage?
Simon Mann: There was an interview a few days later. But I was fully expecting that when I touched Equatorial Guinean soil, somebody was just going to walk up to me and shoot me right in the head. Welcome to Equatorial Guinea. Instead of which, the general who turned out was head of security, General Manuel, comes up to me and says, in English, “Mr Mann, please get into the back of the Toyota. And please don’t worry. We’re going to do our best to help you if you do your best to help us.” I thought, aha, this is so much better than a nine-millimetre.
Brian Rose: Did that give you hope?
Simon Mann: Yes, of course.
Brian Rose: You weren’t suspicious? You thought, he wouldn’t say that unless it meant something?
Simon Mann: Yes.
Brian Rose: He must have known that you thought you were going to get shot.
Simon Mann: Maybe he did.
Brian Rose: But you’re also a cool character, so who knows. And then what do they do with you?
2:41:31 Simon Mann: They took me to Black Beach prison, and my eyes are out on stalks when I arrive, because I think, wow, this is just amazing. There’s a little shop; the prisoners have a little shop, with women running it. It’s a different culture. We’re into the Spanish culture. We’ve left the harsh Anglo-Saxon world of Chikurubi and we’re into a very different place. So I think, this is not so bad. And then they start interrogating me, and then I realise I’m in strict solitary confinement, and I’m in handcuffs and leg irons 24/7, in unbelievable heat. The heat is just off the scale; you can’t imagine. And squadrons of mosquitoes, with no net, nothing, no fan, nothing. I said to them, guys, you’ve got to give me prophylactics against malaria, because I have zero resistance. If you don’t give me prophylactics I will get malaria, and you have cerebral malaria here, which can kill you in 48 hours. So if that’s what you want to happen, fine, but otherwise you’d better give me them. Of course they didn’t give me prophylactics, and within ten days I had malaria.
Brian Rose: What’s that like?
Simon Mann: Not good. There was one moment when I was lying on the floor of the cell in handcuffs and leg irons with a drip in, and the drip bottle on a rusty nail stuck into the wall above me, and I’m screaming, because the needle has slipped in here, so now it’s not going in properly and my arm is just swelling and swelling up with fluid. I know there’s a camera there and a microphone, and I’m screaming, and nobody comes. And I thought, I think I must have hit the bottom here. This is bad. I am really in trouble.
Brian Rose: How were you keeping it together mentally? Four years of incarceration, not knowing what’s going on.
Simon Mann: A lot of people ask me about that. You’ve got no choice. What are you going to do? Freak out, start crying? No one’s going to come, no one’s going to hear. You might make yourself go mad. But on the other hand, going mad is one of the things you’re really frightened of, because death is one thing. You might get a bullet; you wouldn’t even feel anything. But going mad would be a horrible thing, because you might be aware that you are going a bit mad.
Brian Rose: That was something you were very scared of, going mad?
Simon Mann: It’s very scary, I think. In fact, back in Chikurubi my fellow prisoners said, look, Shumba, you’re talking to yourself at night. We can hear you talking to yourself. I said, yes. They said, no, you mustn’t do that; that’s not good. So I thought about it very consciously, and I thought, well, if I stop, will that really be better? So I thought, I’ll do this, but I’ll do it carefully. I’ll keep an eye on myself.
Brian Rose: Because they thought talking to yourself leads to madness?
Simon Mann: Yes, I suppose it’s the old trick. But some of the prisoners definitely thought it was not a good idea.
Brian Rose: They recently sent El Chapo to this maximum-security prison called ADX in Colorado. Apparently it’s the most extreme solitary confinement there is: 23 hours in a cell, one hour outside in a little cage, no contact with anyone, all concrete. It’s been described as hell on earth, and a lot of people there go mad. They cut their fingers off. How do they do that?
Simon Mann: I don’t know. Well, they didn’t let me out of the cell at all. Twenty-four hours, there was no exit.
Brian Rose: And you’re in leg irons.
Simon Mann: Yes, but they came off after my trial. The handcuffs and leg irons came off.
2:46:52 Brian Rose: So now they put you on trial. What are they trying to do here, and what ends up happening?
Simon Mann: My interrogation took about three months, and there were some quite funny incidents. I was actually interrogated by the Attorney General of the country and General Manuel, the head of security, and I quickly realised that there was a catfight going on between the two, because they would never see me unless they were both there, which is overkill. And I then realised, after a few days of this, that I was having a conversation with the president, except that they were the messengers. I was like Scheherazade. I just had to tell the right story. So each morning they’d have a little list of preguntas, Spanish for questions, and it had obviously come from the president. Every evening they were going to the palace, which in good Spanish tradition is just next door to the prison, with the answers of the day, and with the president over a good old dinner probably, they’d work out the questions for tomorrow. So I was actually having this conversation with the president through these guys. Quite early on I said, look, you say you’re going to try and help me, and I’m going to do my best to help you. They never made any promises; it was quite cleverly done. And I said, look, I want to get out of here, and my enemies are your enemies. He said, yes. I said, well, I want a lawyer in here who’s going to do a deal with you, to say that if I give you the information you want, you’re going to let me go. He said, Mr Mann, we do not negotiate with terrorists. And I laughed, and they said, why is that funny? I said, it’s funny because I was an intelligence officer in Northern Ireland, and I know that we always negotiate with terrorists. Everywhere in the world we end up negotiating with the terrorists. So it’s funny.
Brian Rose: What did they say to that?
Simon Mann: They didn’t think it was funny.
Brian Rose: But having a sense of humour, that’s a good sign.
Simon Mann: And the whole thing was like this: on the first day, some Coca-Cola and a sandwich, and by the time my interrogation was finished, lunch was this huge feast being brought in from the general’s hotel, and we had wine.
Brian Rose: You too?
Simon Mann: Yes, because that’s the Spanish culture, mixed with their African culture, and they obviously thought, well, we’re going to have wine, it’s lunch, you’d better have some too. So I’m sitting there. Absolutely hilarious. But I then quite quickly realised what they wanted to know. They’d figured out the palace coup. They wanted to know who was going to do the palace coup, who the traitors were, because they’re still in the palace. That’s who they wanted to know about. And as this realisation dawned on me, I realised that that’s my ticket home, except I don’t know. I just don’t know who they are.
Brian Rose: So the vital piece of information that they spent 80 million dollars to get you for…
Simon Mann: I actually don’t have it. So after a while I convinced them that I don’t have that information. And I said, but I think we can work it out. They said, what do you mean? I said, I spent a year with Ely Calil and the other people involved in this, from when they recruited me to when I was arrested. There have to be mistakes. They concealed the vital information from me. They concealed who the people in the palace are and what the structure is. The only people I met were this one and that one. They must have made mistakes. Give me paper and pencil, and I am going to go through every single moment I can remember of those contacts over that year, and let’s see. And I came up with a meeting, as I was going through it over and over and over. It was one of those meetings, I’m sure you’ve been to them, where you realise halfway through that the published reason for the meeting is not the real reason. There’s something else going on; you’re in that meeting for some other reason than the one you were told. I identified that meeting and identified the guy, called Mohamed Salaam. I knew Hani Salaam, the father of Mohamed, and I’d known Mohamed when he was a boy, because my second wife, an American I was only married to for eight months, was the PA of Hani Salaam. And I thought, wait a minute, that meeting was false. Mohamed Salaam was not there to talk about fishery protection, which was one of the cover stories. He was there to check me out, and that must have been for his father, because Ely Calil, as a Lebanese, would never involve Mohamed without the father’s knowledge. Therefore Hani Salaam is part of this coup. I spent two weeks persuading them, and then one day in walks Mohamed Salaam into my interrogation, wearing a London suit and tie and shirt. I didn’t even know he was in Equatorial Guinea. I had no idea they’d arrested him. Completely mad. So they start interrogating him, and I’m sitting there, handcuffed, in leg irons, probably stinking, and he’s in his suit. They’d just arrested him. They stopped grilling me and started grilling him. After a couple of hours he’s coming under a bit of pressure, and he’s sitting at the end of the table: I’m here, the interpreter here, the Attorney General, General Manuel there. And Mohamed Salaam makes eye contact with each one of us and says, “There’s something I have to tell you. I am a double agent.” I thought, that was terrible. I just turned to the interpreter, a very nice and very smart guy, and said, you don’t see very many of them around these days, do you? There’s that joke about the wide-mouthed frog. It’s a stupid joke: “You don’t see very many of them around these days.” I thought, God, just unbelievable. So clueless. He then got arrested properly, and they just didn’t seem to be able to get anything out of this guy, and I’m just certain. So I say to them, look, let me interrogate him and I’ll nail him. It took me another week to persuade them, and they said, okay, we will let you interrogate him, but the interpreter must be with you, and an old police sergeant. They had this old policeman who they said can tell when somebody is lying; he doesn’t even have to speak the language, he knows a liar. Fine, bring him on. So now I’m conducting my own interrogation within my interrogation.
Brian Rose: This should be a play.
Simon Mann: But Mohamed Salaam doesn’t realise that I know his father, that I was married to the PA, and that I remembered him as a boy in the South of France at Hani’s house. So I got in there and I said, Mohamed, look, there’s only one way we’re getting out of here, you and me, and that is by helping these people flat out. That may not work, but if we don’t try and help them, it definitely won’t work. So let’s help them.
Brian Rose: So we’ve got Eton and, I think, Harrow interrogating each other in Equatorial Guinea.
Simon Mann: So I say, right, I’m just going to take some details down, because I need to get things straight. Name, date of birth. You went to Harrow? Yes. [Personal remarks about Mr Salaam’s family omitted.] And I said, I remember the guards at your father’s house had the M16s hidden under the floorboards in your sister’s bedroom. He said, no, that was under my bed. He was absolutely destroyed. Anyway, we carried on for a bit more and he was all over the place. This is interrogation 101.
Brian Rose: So you’re running on him, to where he just thinks you know everything.
Simon Mann: Yes. And then, this is hilarious…
Brian Rose: It’s nice to see you were having some fun.
Simon Mann: I don’t know. It was pretty desperate, and the story doesn’t end very well for him anyway. So now we’re walking back to our cells under the escort of one of the old guards, not one of the interrogation team, who doesn’t speak any English. We’re halfway there and Mohamed says, I can tell you everything. I was with Ely Calil. I know who the traitors are in the palace. I know this, I know that, I know the other thing. And the dear old sergeant is saying, shut up, stop talking. I’m thinking I should tell the guy who doesn’t speak English that this is it. Anyway, the next morning I say, right, I want to talk to you without him here. Get him out. And I said, right, he’s confessed. He told me this, in a few seconds really, before the guard quite rightly told us to shut up. We’ve got him, and you owe me a pardon. And that’s what happened, eventually.
Brian Rose: Did he sign a confession?
Simon Mann: He started to really cooperate with them, and we got the guy in. It was all very backstairs. And then we got to the trial, and they said, Mr Mann, you’ve been very helpful to us in the interrogation, and we said we’re going to help you, and we are going to help you, but now we want you to be very helpful to us in the trial. It’s very key. What do you want me to do in the trial? They said, well, we want you to plead guilty. I said, oh really, plead guilty to what? And they said: attempted murder, attempted assassination of a head of state, and attempted acts of international terrorism. I said, I can’t plead guilty to those things. You know they’re not true. And they said, don’t worry, but we just want you to plead guilty to those things to help us. At this stage I’ve got nothing to lose. They can just take me out the back and shoot me at any moment, and maybe they will at the trial, I don’t know. So I thought, the only thing to do here is go along with it, and so I did. In the trial they said, so was the United States government involved in this thing? I said, absolutely not. Are you sure? Yes. I don’t believe you. Well, I don’t care whether you believe me or not; that’s the case. I don’t know of any involvement of the United States government. And out of the corner of my eye I see the American ambassador get up and walk out of the court. I thought, well, maybe that’s a good sign. And then they gave me 32 years, and I thought, well, that isn’t very helpful. If we’re talking about being helpful here, 32 years is not helpful.
Brian Rose: How did that feel? Your stomach dropped?
Simon Mann: Yes. I thought, that really is not good. And I remember the BBC guy in the courtroom, with the camera and everything, said, how do you feel about that? And I said, fantastic. How do you think I feel? That bit has been edited out. He said, well, if you’re going to be like that about it. I said, how do you want me to be about it? Start crying?
Brian Rose: Good for you. Good moment.
3:03:10 And so then they take you back to your cell?
Simon Mann: Back to my cell, and then they gave me a fan and a mosquito net, and I started writing books.
Brian Rose: Were you going crazy at this point?
Simon Mann: I don’t know. It’s like the guy who thinks he’s Napoleon: he thinks he’s perfectly sane. And I do think about it, because now I’m holding conversations out loud, but I’m doing all three parts. There’s a conversation between my sister, who obviously isn’t there, my lawyer and me. They’re not there, but I’m doing all three voices. So I think, well, that may be getting a little unhealthy.
Brian Rose: Was this the lowest point of your life?
Simon Mann: No, I wouldn’t say that, actually. I think lying on the floor in handcuffs and leg irons with malaria and a drip, filthy, that was the lowest point. After the trial: no leg irons, no handcuffs, I had a fan, a mosquito net, books, writing material, running water, which we didn’t have in Chikurubi. We used to take the light bulb out of the socket every night, to cook. It was like luxury, really.
Brian Rose: And so you’re there for another year?
Simon Mann: Oh yes.
Brian Rose: And then what happens?
Simon Mann: Well, one Saturday the Attorney General called me over, which is weird, on a weekend, on a Saturday. And there were many adventures: Scotland Yard came three times to see me, all sorts of things happened, and there was a coup attempt one night, with gunfire. Lots of funny things happened. And then this Saturday they got me down there and he said, well, you’re going to get a pardon. On Monday the president’s going to pardon you. And I didn’t really react. He said, well, you don’t seem very pleased. I said, I’ll be pleased when I get it and I walk out of here, but I’m not going to be pleased now. That was on the Saturday, and then on the Monday, nothing. Nothing at all.
Brian Rose: That’s a horrible feeling.
Simon Mann: Well, the whole time I had to basically walk a tightrope between giving up hope and too much hope. I had to be absolutely down that line all the time. A letter from home could completely upset me for ten days; it would take ten days to get over it. So I could absolutely understand why long-term prisoners don’t want letters. They just upset you. You’ve got to stay on that line, and you’ve got to make your world that world. You cannot think about, oh, it’s Sunday, Freddie will be going fishing, or any of that. So birthdays and Christmas are all very upsetting. You’ve just got to absolutely accept: this is your world, this is it, and time passes, and you work to stay on the line. And I think it was about 4:30 or something like that. There was a hole in the wall of the cell which I could look out of if I climbed up. They didn’t like me doing that, because there was a camera in the room, but if I climbed up a little bit and looked for a minute, that was okay. Any longer than that and somebody would come. So I looked out, and there was this old guy walking up and down, and he had a normal commercial radio with an earpiece. I remember he stopped in his walk. Nick du Toit was under the shade, a sort of shelter thing to create some shade, and the old guy walked over to Nick and shook him by the hand, grabbed his arm, and Nick immediately looked up at my cell.
Brian Rose: Nick du Toit, the other South African, your colleague, your number two. And you saw him there?
Simon Mann: Yes, sitting in the shade. And the first thing he did, he looked straight up at my cell, and I knew.
Brian Rose: How did it feel?
Simon Mann: Well, although I knew, I didn’t dare hope. I still didn’t. I thought, these guys will do something, something will fail. And then the next morning I was doing my press-ups, because one of the things I was very tough with myself about was always keeping fit, always taking exercise.
Brian Rose: For your mind?
Simon Mann: Yes. So I had a very strict routine.
Brian Rose: What was the routine?
Simon Mann: I had a day cell and a night cell. I had weekly cleaning, daily cleaning. I was like a guardsman. A day cell and a night cell meaning you prep it differently for the day and the night. I just moved everything about.
Brian Rose: And what did you do for exercise?
Simon Mann: At one time they gave me a little stepper thing, and then that broke, so that was a catastrophe. I managed to get them to give me a heart rate monitor so I could do cardiovascular work, because I said, look, even in Chikurubi I ran a half marathon in the exercise yard, 800 circuits, so at least I could keep fit there, and I can’t keep fit here. They said, okay, we’ll get you this. And then the machine broke, which was a catastrophe. Anyway, the next morning, which was the Tuesday morning, I’m doing my press-ups on the floor of the cell and the cell door opens, and it’s the young officer who ran the prison. He says, what are you doing? I’m doing my exercises. He says, don’t you know what’s happening? I said, no, what’s happening? He said, you’ve got to change. I said, well, I need time to change. He said, yes. So off they go to get my suitcase, bring it up to the cell, I have a shower…
Brian Rose: You still had your suitcase from six years earlier? The same shirt, same tie, same suit you were arrested in?
Simon Mann: I wasn’t actually wearing that suit when I was arrested, but it was in my case. So I put all this stuff on and we go down to the courtroom, which was actually not where we were tried, because it wasn’t big enough, but it was the courtroom they’d built for the trial. I’m sitting there and I’m still thinking they’re going to mess this up, something’s going to happen, because it is kind of a crazy place, an Alice in Wonderland place. And then I saw this car pull up outside, and my sister and my brother got out, and then I knew this was for real, because there’s no way they’re here and it’s not happening. The British government must be involved in this. And an hour later we were sitting in the hotel having lunch. Completely insane.
Brian Rose: What about your emotions? Were you crying?
Simon Mann: I cried when we drove out. There was a great cheer from all the other guys.
Brian Rose: The other prisoners cheered?
Simon Mann: Yes. That was quite a moment. I didn’t really know any of them, because I’d always been in solitary confinement. And in the course of getting a pardon, of course, I had to sign things and say we’d been well treated and this and that, and promise never to come back to Equatorial Guinea. Okay, fine. And I made a little speech thanking them. For the TV, saying that we’d been well looked after, and it had been my stretch here, and so forth. Nick du Toit refused to say anything, which I thought was pretty stupid of him; it wasn’t going to cost him anything. But then he had been arrested there, and he had been pretty harshly treated, very harshly treated, in Equatorial Guinea at the time of the arrest.
Brian Rose: So he’d been there the whole time.
Simon Mann: Yes. And afterwards they pardoned him and three other guys.
Brian Rose: So they pardoned all of you?
Simon Mann: The three guys and Nick went at the same time, but we were separated, because they all went to South Africa and I was going back to the UK. Anyway, so I’ve signed this thing saying I promise never to come back to Equatorial Guinea, and all this stuff, and now we’re having lunch with my sister, my brother, General Manuel and the Attorney General, who by now were sort of my friends. We were in the general’s hotel, which was the hotel that used to provide the lunches for the interrogation, and also used to provide my food every day, because they were terrified that I’d be poisoned. In West Africa there’s a lot of poisoning, and there are a lot of people who even now are very frightened of me in Equatorial Guinea, that I might suddenly say, well, actually, it was him.
Brian Rose: They were very frightened that you might point someone out.
Simon Mann: Yes, because most people didn’t know what was going on inside the interrogation. People didn’t know that I didn’t know. It gets complicated. Anyway, so we’re having lunch and they say, oh, by the way, you know that you signed that piece of paper that said you promised you’d never come back to Equatorial Guinea again? I said yes. They said, well, we don’t want that to apply to you. You’re welcome to come back, but please, without seventy others.
Brian Rose: You can come back, but come back on a commercial flight.
Simon Mann: Lots of laughter. Very funny.
Brian Rose: And you’re feeling good hanging out with these guys?
Simon Mann: Well, yes, I had some more empathy with them in a way. And there was my sister and my brother. I hadn’t seen anybody for five and a half years. And then after quite a while, and not too much wine, a little bit of wine, my sister said, don’t you think you’d better ring Amanda? I thought it was odds-on she was going to tell me that she was very happy I was out of prison but that she had met somebody else. Five and a half years: you can’t even remember what somebody looks like, let alone love them. And all sorts of things had gone on in my head. I was very angry with my family many times, because I didn’t think they were handling it correctly and so on.
Brian Rose: They weren’t helping you?
Simon Mann: They were trying to, but they weren’t doing what I was asking them to do, so there was a lot of tension. But I never associated Amanda with that. Amanda was always in a separate box, an idealised box. So I rang her up, and it was like ringing up for a first date. It was extremely nerve-racking. I thought she’s probably going to tell me to bugger off. And instead we found ourselves laughing on the phone, and I thought, well, if we can laugh after all this, maybe there is hope.
Brian Rose: And you went back to see her the next day?
Simon Mann: The next day we flew to England, and suddenly I’m at the Harrods executive jet terminal at Luton, with people in tailcoats asking me if I’d like a cup of tea. It was just hilarious. And as well as the tailcoat thing going on there, there was Scotland Yard, three policemen.
3:18:04 Brian Rose: And that’s the new adventure. Now you’re back and you’re infamous in the British press, and Scotland Yard. What did the British think of you?
Simon Mann: I think most people thought it was a pretty stupid thing to do, and I think quite pleased that I’d managed to get out in one piece.
Brian Rose: Did your father say anything?
Simon Mann: No, he was dead by then. And my mother too.
Brian Rose: What was the general sentiment about you? Were you bad or good?
Simon Mann: It’s a funny thing. Very few people, in fact nobody really, has said to my face, God, what an idiot you are, what a stupid thing to do, and how wrong. I’m quite sure some people do say that behind my back and think it, but the majority of people just sort of think, well, what a great piece of derring-do, good for you, it’s a great story.
Brian Rose: And the best part is, you go back.
Simon Mann: Yes, I have been back quite a lot. I’m quite friendly with the president.
Brian Rose: You met him when you went back?
Simon Mann: Yes, about two months after I was out, in January 2010. They said, would you like to come back to Equatorial Guinea and thank the president for your pardon? And I said yes, of course. And when I got home and told Amanda, she said, you are kidding. You can’t do that. I said, no, I have to do that. I must do it. Why wouldn’t I?
Brian Rose: There’s no danger really? This is Africa.
Simon Mann: No, there’s no danger, because Africa’s very good at looking after guests, like Arab culture. If you’re the guest, you’re safe, and I knew that.
Brian Rose: There’s also something called Stockholm syndrome, where you get to love the people who were your captors.
Simon Mann: I think it’s Stockholm syndrome in reverse: they love me.
Brian Rose: And you saw the president. Did you take Amanda with you?
Simon Mann: No, although she has been, on the last trip.
Brian Rose: And what did you talk to the president about when you met him?
Simon Mann: Well, thank you very much, and so on. He embraces me when he sees me. It’s quite emotional.
Brian Rose: Why does he feel that way about you? You did help him.
Simon Mann: I helped him, yes. I really made an earnest effort, and we went through that whole thing of the interrogation. In fact the first time I saw him he said, I want you to understand some things about your release. First of all, by our African standards I didn’t have to release you. I could have kept you forever. I could have had you shot, and no one would have minded in Africa. It would have been fine. I said, yes, that sounds about right. And then he said, and I want you to know that it was me that let you go. It wasn’t anybody else. It wasn’t the British government or the South African government or somebody else telling me what to do. It was me. Then the next thing he said was, I’ve been president for 30 years and I’ve never had a case where so many different people asked me for the same thing. I don’t know how it was done, but the rabbis were asking for your release, the Vatican was asking for your release, the Israelis. Everybody asked me for your release. Quite extraordinary. I said, oh, well, that’s nice. And then he said, but the most important thing I want you to know is that the person who had the most to do with your release, the person who actually created your release, was you. Which was just a very nice thing to say.
Brian Rose: What does that mean?
Simon Mann: I’m not sure.
Brian Rose: He respected you. That’s what it means.
Simon Mann: I think he wanted me to feel that I’d created it, that I’d helped myself.
Brian Rose: But he respected your character, not just you helping him out. He must have respected who you were.
Simon Mann: I think he did, in the end. And we have quite a good rapport. It’s not like it’s a great hoot, because the language thing is so complicated.
Brian Rose: But you’ve been back a few times.
Simon Mann: I’ve been back about four times now.
Brian Rose: And he’s still the ruler? He still rules the country?
Simon Mann: Oh yes, he’s still there. And it has changed as a country since, apparently. That’s what I’m told.
Brian Rose: And what is your relationship now with Africa? You go back, you still do business?
Simon Mann: Yes. And senior Africans find this whole story just quite incredible. They say, you actually tried to overthrow him and now you’re friends with him? Oh my goodness. And they think that’s terrific.
Brian Rose: So it’s a selling point.
Simon Mann: Well, it’s definitely a door opener. I’m not sure about a selling point.
3:24:15 Brian Rose: And what about trauma? Do you think you had some, and did you have to process it over the next few years?
Simon Mann: I think inevitably, yes. I think I probably should have had therapy when I was released, but I didn’t, and I think that was probably a mistake, in retrospect. I think it would probably have been better if I had.
Brian Rose: Why do you say that?
Simon Mann: Well, I thought I was fine, absolutely fine.
Brian Rose: You thought you were strong.
Simon Mann: Yes. I don’t think I was.
Brian Rose: Are you a little crazy, Simon?
Simon Mann: Not really.
Brian Rose: Were you always this way?
Simon Mann: Which way?
Brian Rose: The way you are now.
Simon Mann: Well, telling you all of this is quite emotional for me. Whenever I recount what I’ve just told you, about my release, when I was told, and then I saw the old man and the thumbs-up, and then I saw my brother and sister, those are very emotional moments. That was the 4th of November 2009, and that is my second birthday. I regard that as my birthday, because it’s like the second time I’ve been born. And when I see the president, in a sense he’s like a father, and he says, you are part of our family now. Isn’t that the strangest thing? And maybe not so strange.
Brian Rose: It really is a story, because if you had been successful, he would most likely be dead.
Simon Mann: I hope not. That was definitely never the idea. Hopefully he’d be living comfortably somewhere in Switzerland, in a friendly canton somewhere.
Brian Rose: Maybe, maybe not. And yet now you’re part of the family, because he respects the way you’ve carried yourself and handled it.
Simon Mann: But don’t forget there’s a strange part to this story, which is that he was in the same prison for the same offence once, because he tried to overthrow his uncle, who was the president, and failed, and was thrown into Black Beach prison, and his uncle pardoned him. And then he did it again, and he was successful.
Brian Rose: This is like a novel, a movie. You can’t make this up. This is stranger than fiction.
Simon Mann: It is, actually, especially this bit.
Brian Rose: And you didn’t know that until later, or did you know when you were in prison?
Simon Mann: Actually, I did.
Brian Rose: Is this a cycle he repeated, then? Did he have empathy for what you were going through?
Simon Mann: I don’t think so, no. And now he has actually asked me about security issues, and even the succession issue, which is massive in Equatorial Guinea.
Brian Rose: It’s next his son, Teodoro? And he’s asking your thoughts on that?
Simon Mann: Well, yes. The complication is that Teodoro is the wild man, whereas the other son, Gabriel, is the not-wild man. He speaks English very well; he’s the one who runs oil and gas. But Teodoro is the more senior one, and the president wants Teodoro to be the next president, which obviously in 2019 is not very fashionable. Dynasties are out, supposedly.
Brian Rose: So you’re advising on that?
Simon Mann: He has asked my advice. I’m not going to say what I said, because that would be breaking a confidence.
3:28:52 Brian Rose: What do you want people to learn from your story?
Simon Mann: I think there’s a good element of personal resilience. The human mind and the human body are just phenomenally strong, and you can train yourself a bit and prepare yourself a bit for hard times, in quite a lot of different ways, I think. I had the routine; the routine was absolutely crucial. There’s a very good book by a SEAL officer…
Brian Rose: Make Your Bed.
Simon Mann: Yes. He is so right, spot on. Make your bed. Keep fit. Do something artistic: draw a picture, learn a poem, sing a song, do something on the arty side. And then the fourth is to keep a log of those three, so that you’ve got an audit trail, because that makes you proud. You can say, I’ve done those three things every day for the last 20 days. I haven’t missed. I haven’t had a bad day. It gives you something; I don’t know what exactly. It’s like people say, write a diary, keep a log. That’s very powerful. So there’s that: looking after yourself, maintenance of your morale, discipline, self-discipline, all that good stuff. And then there is leadership after failure. I’m in prison, but I’ve still got 65 people with me who I’ve led into prison. Some of them I’ve known for years. We’ve been through Angola, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea, all of these things have happened, and they’re there because they trust me. Many of them made no bones about it. They just said, well, the reason we’re here is because we know you guys. We don’t have to ask questions; we trust you. I actually went to the Staff College, the UK combined services senior staff college, and they give you the title of your talk. You don’t talk about what you want to talk about; they tell you. And the title of my talk there, to my peers, was “Leadership after failure”. The admiral in charge of the whole thing stood up at the end and said, right, guys, we are in the business of soldiering, military matters, and things do go wrong. That’s just part of the game, part of what we do, and you still have to lead the people under your command. You may have driven your ship onto a rock, and you may know that your career is over and that you’ve made a complete fool of yourself, but you are still the leader of the men who are there with you. You are the boss. So you’ve got to still be able to do the leadership thing even after your entire world has just collapsed around you, and you know that your kids are probably being bullied at school because of what’s happened, your wife is quite possibly being ostracised by her peers at home, and all of those terrible things, money, career, all of that, is going through your head. But you’ve still got to be able to keep the show on the road. You can’t just check out. So I think there are some terrific leadership aspects to that, because I think there’s an awful lot of rubbish talked about leadership, especially on the internet.
Brian Rose: On Twitter, LinkedIn.
Simon Mann: Oh my goodness. I read this stuff and it’s just pulp.
Brian Rose: It’s very fashionable these days.
Simon Mann: Well, because leadership is very important. I’ve been to the Leadership Trust down at Ross-on-Wye, which was an amazing set-up and an amazing one-week course, and I learnt there about some of this, about teaching leadership. One of the things is you can’t tell people how to ride a bicycle. You can read a thousand books on riding a bicycle and you can’t ride a bicycle. You have to get on it and ride it. And leadership is really about self-leadership. It’s about truth with yourself, because I think the real key to leadership is personal honesty. There are a million different ways to lead other people, as many different ways as there are different people in different situations, but I think an honest appraisal of oneself creates that sense of trust, because people will trust the truth, and if you haven’t got that within yourself, then it isn’t going to get to them either. You can fool some of the people some of the time, but not all the people all the time, and the one person you can’t fool is yourself.
Brian Rose: Sometimes you can, right?
Simon Mann: Well, you can try.
3:35:19 Brian Rose: What’s next for you? What do you want to do in the next ten years?
Simon Mann: I’d like to publish the books I wrote in prison, the work of fiction, the novels, from Equatorial Guinea. And there’s a possibility of making a TV series about my adventures, which would be good.
Brian Rose: That seems like a no-brainer.
Simon Mann: I’m sure you’ve heard all sorts of people talk about the film business; it never goes anywhere. In fact, I’m not going to name names, but there’s one quite senior Hollywood movie director who said, well, the trouble is, Simon, you’re not black. And I laughed. He said, what’s funny about that? Because in Hollywood everybody’s got to be black now, apparently. He said, why is that so funny? And I said, because another movie director here in London said, the pity, Simon, is that you’re not dead. So apparently I ought to be black and I ought to be dead, and then it would be much easier to make a movie.
Brian Rose: Well, I think it would be an incredible movie. I don’t know how you’d fit it all in a movie. We can barely fit all this in an episode.
Simon Mann: I think there’s a chance of doing a box set: three series of one-hour episodes.
Brian Rose: Documentary or dramatised?
Simon Mann: Dramatised.
Brian Rose: Like a Netflix three-season thing. What would you call it? Executive Outcomes?
Simon Mann: I don’t know. I think somebody’s going to have to work that out. Well, you could call it Cry Havoc, which is my book, which describes all of this in pretty good detail. It got very badly mauled by the lawyers, as Lady Thatcher was still alive and Ely Calil was still alive, and there was a gang of lawyers trying to get the book stopped. So in order to get it out, it got badly mauled.
Brian Rose: Any repercussions for the Thatcher family on the back of what happened?
Simon Mann: Well, no, because the book that was published had the approval of their lawyers. A deal was done.
Brian Rose: Gotcha. We do negotiate with terrorists. And Ely Calil, what happened to him?
Simon Mann: Dead.
Brian Rose: And Mohamed Salaam?
Simon Mann: Insane, and in Beirut. He was actually released before me, on medical grounds. He just lost it completely in the prison system, completely. They let him go.
Brian Rose: And the rest of your guys?
Simon Mann: It was tough. Many of them… there’s no welfare system in South Africa.
Brian Rose: Did they all get out? Did they make it out of Zimbabwe?
Simon Mann: Oh yes, everybody got out. Actually it was a big moral issue for me: would I get out before everybody else, or would I insist on being the last man? That’s an interesting one, because about halfway through I realised that actually the best thing I could do would be to get out in order to pull the others out, because I would be able to do that with much more energy and probably in a better way.
Brian Rose: Or is that the brain playing a game on you, to get out?
Simon Mann: Well, that’s exactly what I had to ask myself many times.
Brian Rose: And did you get out before them?
Simon Mann: No. Nick and the three others who were with me in EG, all four, were the last, together. Two people died in prison. One of my men, who was HIV positive, died in Zimbabwe, because they didn’t give him his antiretrovirals. And Gerhard Merz, a German citizen, died under interrogation in Equatorial Guinea immediately after he was arrested, when again they wouldn’t let him have his medication. He had a heart condition, and he died.
Brian Rose: Will you ever go back into the PMC business?
Simon Mann: PMC, like we’ve said, can cover a multitude of sins and virtues. I have a son who’s got a very good security company, which isn’t a PMC. It’s a security company. But a security company becomes a PMC very easily if the right contract is there, which won’t mean that they’re mercenaries, of course, God forbid. I said to him, are you sure, Jack, that the world needs another security company owned and run by a member of this family? He said, absolutely, Dad.
Brian Rose: Good for him.
Simon Mann: So he’s doing very well. It’s London based, and it’s top-end security, almost concierge-type business. Somebody will want a Rolls-Royce, but they’ll want the chauffeur to be bodyguard trained, so they’ll organise that. Or somebody wants a house swept for electronic eavesdropping, or somebody wants their whole family to be cyber-checked. So it’s top-end London, but he’s got some international clients, big Saudi business people.
Brian Rose: Can you go back to Zimbabwe?
Simon Mann: I have done, of course.
Brian Rose: Some interesting moments?
Simon Mann: Now it’s Emmerson Mnangagwa, who I’ve never met, but who was always a friend while I was in prison. He used to send me messages through my lawyer.
Brian Rose: So you went back after Mugabe left?
Simon Mann: Yes. I wouldn’t have gone back before. I would only have gone had I had a letter from him personally, because I know how tricky they are there.
Brian Rose: It’s still strange to me that you would go at all, but that’s you.
Simon Mann: I don’t want to feel that I can’t go somewhere.
Brian Rose: And you go to America, no problem?
Simon Mann: I have been lots of times, and I love going to America, so that’s been fine.
Brian Rose: They don’t check at the airport or anything?
Simon Mann: No. I’m a veteran, remember.
Brian Rose: Is there anything that we haven’t covered, Simon?
Simon Mann: Plenty. Luckily there are lots of the stories in Cry Havoc.
3:43:06 Brian Rose: I always ask everyone a few questions at the end. If you could pick up the phone and call the 20-year-old Simon Mann, based on everything you know right now, I guess you’d be in the Scots Guards?
Simon Mann: No, I was still at school.
Brian Rose: Okay. If you could call him now and give him advice based on what the 67-year-old knows now, what would you tell him?
Simon Mann: I think I’d say pretty much what my father said to me around that time, which was just: stay true to yourself, at all costs.
Brian Rose: Were you tempted to go away from that at any point? The cricket route, or people telling you to do this or that?
Simon Mann: Away from doing what my father said? No. Away from being true to myself? Yes, of course. I doubt there’s a human being who can honestly say otherwise; it would be a saint who managed that. But I think that’s the goal, and I think it goes back to what we were talking about with leadership.
Brian Rose: Being true to yourself is exactly it. It’s that honesty.
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Simon Mann: And the trust comes from their own honesty with themselves, because if they’re fooling themselves about themselves, then that’s going to show, and that dishonesty, I think, we detect.
Brian Rose: Most definitely. Second part of that question: the best advice you’ve ever received. It could be military advice, it could be from a mercenary, it could be from the president of an African country.
Simon Mann: Well, the man who I hold in very, very high esteem is Colonel David Stirling. He was my friend, as well as being who he was, which was the founder of the SAS. He was much older than me, long dead now, but he would just say, Simon, you’ve just got to go for the jugular.
Brian Rose: What does that mean?
Simon Mann: Don’t walk around. If you get into a fight, if you’re in a fight, if there’s a war, if we’ve got to do something, you’ve got to go for the most decisive point. The Schwerpunkt, as the German staff call it.
Brian Rose: Last part of that question: to the 20-year-old who’s watching and listening to us right now, what advice would you give them?
Simon Mann: Advice to give to a 20-year-old? The same: be true to yourself. If it’s good enough advice to give myself, why wouldn’t it be? And don’t try any of this stuff.
Brian Rose: Don’t try this at home, kids. I think your advice to them would be to go and get some, because that’s what you’ve been doing for the last 50 years. You’re going out there and going for it.
Simon Mann: But there are lots of different ways of doing it. I meet a lot of people who have, I’m not going to say stupid, ideas about the necessity of it. A lot of people who’ve led, let’s say, very conventional lives, and this happens quite a bit, say, oh my God, I wish I’d done this and I wish I’d done that and I wish I’d done the other, as if there’s some kind of point-scoring exercise going on, some kind of macho thing: well, if you haven’t done this, that and the other thing, then you haven’t really lived. I don’t think that’s true. I think you can be very brave, very interesting and very courageous in what you do, and successful in what you do, without being in some kind of macho competition.
Brian Rose: It’s not necessary to go to an African prison.
Simon Mann: No. Well, I’ll tell you, there’s a friend of mine who is South African. I’m not going to go into details, but he’s a very wealthy man from a very well-established business family in South Africa, so an unbelievable amount going for him, and he’s a GP. In the middle of the whole Angolan thing he got hold of me and said, Simon, I want to come up to Angola with you guys. I want to do the Executive Outcomes thing, I want to go up there and find the diamonds and fight UNITA. And I said, you are actually delusional. You don’t want to do that. He said, ah, but I’m so good. And I thought, what possesses people to think that there’s something magic out there that’s going to transform them? It’s not that. War’s not glamorous.
Brian Rose: Definitely not.
Simon Mann: It’s very nasty.
Brian Rose: I can imagine. Simon, thank you so much for retelling that story. I know it’s emotional, and I know it’s something that you probably can’t revisit very often, and I really appreciate you doing it. It’s so insightful to me, and I think it’s fascinating. Honestly, I’ve always enjoyed your story, and I wish I had done everything you did.
Simon Mann: No, you don’t.
Brian Rose: I do, I do. I wish I had done it, and I would probably, hopefully, have made the same choices, because it just sounds gangster.
Simon Mann: I hope you’d make better ones.
Brian Rose: Maybe. You went for it. You went for the jugular, you pulled the trigger, you did the crazy stuff, and that’s what life is all about, to a certain extent. I know it’s not for everybody, but I can see why the president of Equatorial Guinea respects you, because you’ve done some things, you put it on the line and you went for it. That’s why I like your story, and I think that’s why everyone likes your story. In a world of political correctness it’s refreshing to have someone here who’s not, and I know we’re going to get a lot of flak for this, and people are going to say, why are you doing this, it’s kind of horrible. But I just think you’re amazing, and I appreciate you telling the story not once but twice on the show. If people want a similar story with different details, they can watch the first episode, but I learned a lot here. So next time you come back we’ll have to talk about Papua New Guinea and all those other things that we didn’t go into. But look, I really appreciate it, and the advice about leadership is really strong. There’s just so much to learn from this episode. I’m looking forward to the Netflix show, I’m looking forward to the books, and if I ever get into a prison, I know what to do.
Simon Mann: Well, thank you. My pleasure.
Brian Rose: Simon, all the best.
Simon Mann: Okay, thank you.